Social Movements in the Americas

Does border enforcement deter unauthorized immigration? The case of Mexican migration to the United States of America

2008-05-02T12:23:00.000-07:00

Have US border enforcement efforts deterred unauthorized migration from Mexico? Neoclassical economic theory suggests that wage differentials should matter most in migration decisions, yet border enforcement and other immigration controls are designed to restrict access to labor markets. In the current era of economic globalization, states have insisted on strict immigration controls, even while liberalizing the flow of goods, services, and capital. While some regions of the world – most notably the states belonging to the European Union – have relaxed or eliminated restrictions on migration among member-states, the general trend has been to increase barriers to entry. This pattern is most striking along the US–Mexico border, where since the early 1990s there has been a step-level increase in resources and personnel to prevent the entry of undocumented migrants. But the recent deployment of ships, planes, and advanced radar systems by EU members to interdict Europe-bound African migrants at sea suggests a similar commitment to border enforcement as the primary instrument of immigration control.

This paper asks whether "policy matters" in the migration decisions of Mexican immigrants to the USA. Has increased vigilance to stop undocumented migration along the 2,000-mile US–Mexico border had a significant influence on propensity of individuals to migrate? Enhanced border enforcement efforts promised to decrease the probability of successful unauthorized entry, thereby lowering the expected benefits of migration. In addition, the evidence suggests that since the initiation of "Operation Gatekeeper" and other such concentrated border enforcement initiatives, the risk of death and injury as a consequence of clandestine entry has increased sharply, along with the fees that professional people-smugglers charge for their services (Cornelius 2001, 2005; Reyes et al. 2002). Do these increased costs and risks deter potential migrants? Or do persisting economic incentives to migrate outweigh these considerations?

Theoretically, answers to these questions shed light on the role of the state in managing migration and controlling its borders. Determining who is allowed access is a key ingredient of state sovereignty (Guiraudon & Lahav 2000; Rudolph 2003, 2006). If current border enforcement efforts do little to counteract labor-market forces, then the ability of the state to enforce its immigration laws is undermined.1 On a practical level, gaining a better understanding of migration decisions can help in formulating better immigration control policies. With more than 400,000 Mexican migrants entering the USA each year, the choice of immigration policy has a profound influence on economic outcomes in both countries and the fortunes of migrants themselves.

In this paper we seek to determine whether the perception of danger and/or difficulty in illegally crossing the border in the current period of heightened border controls has a significant influence on the propensity to migrate. Previous research has sought to measure the deterrent effect of border enforcement by correlating survey data on decisions to migrate with aggregate measures of changes in the US border enforcement effort (numbers of Border Patrol agents deployed, line-watch hours, apprehensions made) and changes in economic performance on both sides of the border (Espenshade 1995; Espenshade & Acevedo 1995; Hanson & Spilimbergo 2001; Reyes et al. 2002; Cerrutti & Massey 2004; Orrenius 2004; Bean & Lowell 2007). Although our results are generally consistent with those of these researchers, who found that increased enforcement resources deployed along the border have had little effect on the probability of undocumented migration, our approach differs from theirs in that it uses direct evidence on the migrant’s own perceptions of danger and difficulty in crossing the border clandestinely.2 The actual resources deployed may be less important than the effect of border enforcement on the perceptions of potential first-time migrants and repeat migrants in Mexico. Our study collected individual and community-level data that enable us to establish direct linkages between changes in immigration control policy (i.e., the implementation of the post-1993 strategy of concentrated border enforcement) and the propensity to migrate.
Literature review: The political economy of international migration

According to classical economic models of factor mobility, differences in factor endowments between two countries should lead to migration out of labor-abundant countries and into labor-scarce regions until the price of labor converges to an equilibrium wage. Quite simply, workers are expected to move to areas where wages are higher. In the case of the USA and Mexico, the average hourly wage in Mexico in 2000 was approximately $1.80 (Chiquiar & Hanson 2005). With wages even for unskilled undocumented workers averaging 4–6 times this amount in the USA, there are powerful economic incentives for people to migrate north. Another economic perspective focuses on the family rather than the individual as the locus of migration decision-making. The sending of remittances to family members who remain in the country of origin can significantly improve on their consumption and investment habits, providing strong social pressures to send at least some members of the household to work abroad (Taylor 1999). Inter-family comparisons of wealth and status between those who receive remittances and those who do not place additional pressures on working age members of the household to migrate to counter this income inequality.

Although economic and sociological theories of international migration have dominated the published work, political scientists have called for a deeper understanding of the politics of international migration (Hollifield 2000; Cornelius & Rosenblum 2005). Whereas labor-market forces are clearly important in shaping the migration decisions of individuals and households, nation-states determine the terms of access to the domestic labor force. States impose immigration controls to shape the overall supply of labor as well as the quality of the labor force. For instance, although most Western industrialized nations provide relatively few visas for unskilled foreign labor, there is strong competition among them to attract highly skilled migrants with advanced degrees (Cornelius et al. 2001). In addition, there have been bolder measures in most OECD countries to fortify national boundaries against the unauthorized entry of "undesirable" migrants (Andreas & Snyder 2000; Geddes 2000; Cornelius et al. 2004; Lahav 2004).3 Despite the academic discourse about economic integration and the emergence of a "borderless world" (Ohmae 1996; Sassen 1996), enhanced migration controls suggest different standards with respect to particular types of flows. Therefore, an individual’s utility for migrating is not a simple function of wage differentials, but must be discounted by the probability of successful entry into the labor market, and this is determined by the state’s immigration policies.

However, economic theory would also suggest that immigration restrictions – just as capital controls and trade barriers – lead to a suboptimal allocation of economic resources as they reduce the supply of labor below that which the market would decide. This undersupply should in turn lead to the creation of a "black-market" for immigrant labor to meet the unmet demand for workers. Indeed, recent years have brought the emergence of elaborate human smuggling operations that rival the international drug trade in terms of ingenuity and profitability (Kyle & Koslowski 2001). This illicit entry of people circumvents the sovereign prerogative of the state to control its borders and restrict the entry of foreign nationals; it also empowers organized crime networks. Whereas it is unclear whether a tough public stance against illegal immigration is the sincere preference of government officials torn between restrictionist voters and powerful employer lobbies, several scholars have noted a growing gap between the stated objectives of immigration control policies and the outcomes of such policies (Joppke 1998; Freeman 2002; Cornelius et al. 2004). Thus, the actual impact of immigration control policies on the migration choices of individuals is an important empirical and theoretical question. Immigration restrictions should, in principle, reduce an individual’s propensity to migrate, but imperfections in immigration enforcement provide opportunities to evade such measures.
Policing the US–Mexico border

The early to mid-1990s brought increased pressure on elected officials in the USA to reduce undocumented immigration from Mexico. Thus, while the USA and Mexico were busy liberalizing regional trade and investment – particularly through the North American Free Trade Agreement – immigration restrictions were strengthened. In the US Southwest in particular, fears that undocumented migrants undercut wages, consumed social services, and contributed to crime led to public clamor for increased vigilance at the border. A series of border enforcement efforts beginning with "Operation Hold the Line" (1993) in El Paso and "Operation Gatekeeper" (1994) in San Diego significantly increased the visibility of US Border Patrol agents. During this period, Congress and the President worked together to significantly increase enforcement personnel and resources along the US–Mexico border. Approximately 70 miles of the border were fenced to prevent crossings in urban areas where illegal entry was most visible. In addition, there has been a remarkable increase in the sophistication of surveillance and apprehension technology, including remote video surveillance systems, infrared monitors, seismic sensors that can detect footsteps, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), and computerized databases to identify recidivists and people-smugglers among those apprehended. The number of Border Patrol agents rose from 3,965 in September 1993 to 12,349 in September 2006, and spending on border enforcement grew sixfold during this period. Since Fiscal Year 2002, the growth in spending has outpaced increases in apprehensions being made at the border, so each arrest costs more (Fig. 1).

The principal rationale for increasing border enforcement was the doctrine of "prevention through deterrence." It was believed that by significantly increasing apprehension rates and the visibility of the Border Patrol, potential migrants would be dissuaded from attempting a crossing. In testimony before the House of Representatives, Barbara Jordan, Chair of the Congressionally mandated US Commission on Immigration Reform, remarked, "It is far better to deter illegal immigration than to play the cat and mouse game that results from apprehensions followed by return followed by re-entry. To accomplish a true deterrence strategy will require additional personnel as well as a strategic use of technology and equipment" (House of Representatives 29 March 1995, emphasis added). Again, in economic terms, if the probability of successful entry is low enough, then wage differentials between the two countries should matter less in the decision calculus of potential migrants.

In addition to increasing apprehension rates, which was the explicitly stated aim of government officials at the time, enhancing the US Border Patrol’s capabilities had several important unintended consequences. First, whereas urban areas – for example, San Diego, El Centro, Nogales, and El Paso – witnessed the erection of fences, lighting, and an increase in agents, remote areas in the mountains and deserts along the border were left largely unprotected.4 This has led many migrants to attempt riskier crossing strategies over difficult and dangerous terrain; concomitantly, the risk of injury and/or death has increased sharply in recent years (Cornelius 2001). Between January 1995 and September 2006, there were over 4,045 known migrant fatalities because of unauthorized border crossings; dehydration and hypothermia were the most common causes of death. Second, although the use of professional people-smugglers ("coyotes") to assist in illegal entry was widespread among Mexican migrants by the late 1980s (see Cerrutti & Massey 2004, pp. 29–30; Cornelius & Lewis 2006, pp. 64–66), the proportion of migrants using smugglers rose further in the post-1993 period. Coyotes are hired to lead migrants through difficult crossing areas, provide fraudulent identity documents, and transport migrants to pick-up points where relatives or employers retrieve them. As the demand for their services increased with tighter border enforcement, people-smugglers have tripled or quadrupled their fees (see Cornelius & Lewis 2006, pp. 67–68).

This discussion suggests that migration decisions by Mexicans without legal documents are a function of several factors: relative wages, the probability of successful entry, the risk of physical harm, and coyote fees are all taken into consideration. Yet, with expected earnings in the USA being several times that in Mexico, it remains to be seen if the costs and risks of crossing the border have deterred a substantial number of Mexicans from migrating without papers. In the sections that follow we will attempt to determine if migrants’ subjective assessment of these added costs have had a significant influence on their plans to go north. Theoretically, those at the "cusp" of migrating should be deterred by these additional factors, but whether there has been a systematic deterrent effect at the individual level has not previously been substantiated.
Research design and methods

We report results from a survey of 603 returned migrants and potential first-time migrants who were interviewed in their homes in Mexico by a team of bilingual US and Mexican interviewers during January 2005. The research sites were Tlacuitapa, Jalisco, and Las Animas, Zacatecas, rural communities with high rates of migration to the USA, located in states that traditionally have sent large numbers of migrants to the USA. The research communities were chosen purposively to take advantage of extensive baseline data from previous surveys of migration behavior conducted in these towns (Cornelius 1976, 1991, 1998; Mines 1981; Goldring 1992).

A standardized questionnaire was administered to at least one adult in every dwelling unit that was occupied during the fieldwork period. Because of the small sizes of the populations of the research communities (800–1,500), no sampling was necessary. In each dwelling, the interviewer was instructed first to interview the male head of household. If the male head of household was unavailable throughout the fieldwork period, interviewers were instructed to interview his wife about her husband’s migration experiences. If at that time the wife volunteered that she had migration experience of her own, she was interviewed concerning her own migration experience as well. After interviewing the head of household, the questionnaire was next administered to all sons and daughters of at least 15 years of age. We administered the standardized questionnaire only to people aged 15–65, as we expected to find most of the current and potential migrants in this age range. Of the 603 persons interviewed, 68% were categorized by interviewers as having their principal base in the sending community, whereas 31% were based primarily in the USA and were making short visits to their hometowns at the time of our fieldwork.

The questionnaire contained a total of 143 items (see Cornelius & Lewis 2006, appendix A). In addition to questions pertaining to basic demographic attributes, the questionnaire contained sections on employment and residency in 2004; the migratory history of the family from 1995 to 2005; the migratory history of the interviewee; intentions to migrate in the 12 months following the interview; employment and life in the USA; perceptions of the interviewee’s hometown and his economic situation; and plans for the future. Although most of the questions were closed, open-ended questions were included to elicit more fine-grained information on various aspects of the US migration experience. The average administration time was 50 minutes.
Analysis

In general, if the "prevention through deterrence" strategy were effective, we would expect people to become less inclined to migrate as: (i) their information about enhanced US border enforcement measures increases; (ii) perceptions of risk and danger increase; (iii) actual negative experiences during past crossings increases. A show of force at the border can only be effective if people are aware of heightened restrictions and that they perceive and/or have actually experienced that such policies make crossing much more difficult. An ideal test of deterrence theory would gauge people’s attitudes before and after the implementation of border enforcement policies. We cannot do so with our cross-sectional research design. However, we are able to determine if our respondents’ knowledge, perceptions, and experience with border enforcement policies are important determinants of their decisions to migrate. Thus, we can estimate the relative significance of economic/demographic factors and immigration control policies.

Our main dependent variable for the analysis that follows (Q71) asks whether the person being interviewed intends to migrate at some time during 2005.5 While we realize that there may be some slippage between stated intentions in January 2005 and actual migration outcomes during the year, we believe that this question can reliably get at the type of person who is most likely to migrate. Of the people who responded to this question, 51% responded in yes, that they have at least considered migrating to the USA.

One way of ascertaining a deterrent effect is to simply ask the "no" respondents why they do not wish to migrate. As such, we asked these people to give the main reason why they were not willing to migrate (Q77). Although lack of economic need, lack of interest, and family considerations dominated the responses to this question, 41 people answered that difficulty crossing was their main reason for staying home, whereas an additional 14 people answered that they could not afford coyote and/or transportation costs. In all then, 55 out of 603 survey respondents indicated that they were deterred from crossing because of the direct or indirect effects of US Border Enforcement policies.6 However, it is also important to consider the perceptions, information, and experiences of those who do wish to migrate along with additional control variables.

As our main variables of interest, we include survey items dealing with perceptions of difficult and danger crossing the border. One question (Q80) asked about perceptions of difficulty in evading the US Border Patrol in the current period. Six percent of our respondents indicated that it is not more difficult to cross; 23% answered that it is now somewhat more difficult; 66% responded that it is much more difficult to cross; and 5% answered that it is now virtually impossible to cross. A second question (Q78) asked interviewees about their level of information regarding current US Border Patrol policies. People were asked if they were aware of current efforts to make unauthorized crossings into the USA more difficult. In answering this question, 72% of the respondents indicated that they were aware of heightened security at the border. Third, we asked a question (Q84) about the perceptions of danger in crossing without legal documents. The overwhelming majority (80%) of survey respondents answered that it is very dangerous to cross; only 20% believed that it is only somewhat dangerous or not at all dangerous. Although this question is subjective, we also asked people if they actually knew someone who had died while attempting to cross into the USA (Q85), as people who knew someone who died may be more directly attuned to this extreme risk. Sixty-four percent of those who answered the question indicated that they did know someone who died en route to the USA.

To summarize, we found our interviewees to be well informed about Border Patrol efforts; indeed, a large majority believed that it is much more difficult to surmount the obstacle course at the border. Moreover, a majority believe that it is much more dangerous to cross the border clandestinely today as compared with previous periods. Nevertheless, more than half (51%) reported that they were considering a journey north.

Although these perceptual factors are important, we also asked people with a previous migration history about their personal experience crossing the border. Perhaps direct experience is more important than perceptions. In our survey sample, 64% or 383 individuals indicated that they had migrated to the USA before (of these, 184 were undocumented). Of those who had previously migrated, we asked whether they were apprehended by the Border Patrol on their most recent trip to the border (Q62). Of the entire subset of people who had crossed before – with or without legal documents – 13% indicated that they had been caught by the Border Patrol; of only those individuals crossing without papers, 25% indicated that they had been caught trying to cross.7 We also asked whether the most recent trip to the USA was more difficult than they had anticipated versus less difficult/about the same (Q58). Twenty-two percent of experienced migrants reported that the crossing was harder than they had expected. Restricting this analysis to only those crossing without papers, 44% indicated that their journey was more difficult than expected.

These variables form the core of our analysis. In the regressions that follow we include these variables about potential migrants’ level of information about Border Patrol efforts, their perceptions of difficulty/danger in crossing the frontier, and in separate regressions restricted to experienced migrants, we include information about their past attempts at crossing. Summary statistics for each of these main independent variables, along with our main dependent variable of interest are presented in Table 1.

We also include several control variables in the analysis. Much of the published work suggests that the typical Mexican migrant to the USA is a working age man.8 Therefore we include a dichotomous variable for sex (female, 1), along with age and age squared to account for a parabolic relation between age and propensity to migrate (the very young and the elderly are less likely to migrate). We include additional demographic controls for marital status (married, 1) as well as the number of children the respondent has. We also include a pair of controls for the respondent’s economic status. Whereas we lack wage data for our individual respondents, we include a subjective self-assessment of economic status in which people were asked to rate their economic welfare on a scale from 1 to 10. We also include a variable for the number of years of schooling the respondent has completed; while education may have an independent effect on the propensity to migrate, education is also expected to be highly related to one’s income. In addition, because there may be unique characteristics of the two towns represented in our study that are not included in the statistical model, we include a "fixed effect" term for the town itself in the form of a dummy variable for "Las Animas". Finally, when restricting our models to the subset of respondents who had migrated before, we include a dichotomous variable for the person’s legal status (documented, 1; undocumented, 0).

Because our dependent variable is dichotomous, we run our models using a logit estimator with robust standard errors. Because several of our independent variables may be highly correlated with each other, we include them sequentially before presenting a model in which all are included. Additional diagnostic testing shows that multicollinearity does not present a significant problem.9 Our most correlated variables (danger crossing and difficulty evading the Border Patrol) were only correlated at the 0.27 level.

We acknowledge that our survey design may suffer from a particular type of response bias, but we can anticipate the direction of this bias. By conducting our interviews in Mexico, our survey does not include people who have already migrated, did not return to their hometowns during the fieldwork (which was timed to coincide with the towns’ annual fiestas), and therefore were not available to be interviewed. Thus, the sample may overrepresent people who stayed in Mexico and underrepresent people who had left. Clearly, undocumented migrants who were in the USA at the time of the survey were not deterred from migrating. Therefore, if there is a deterrent effect, we are more likely to detect it among those who have been successfully dissuaded by border enforcement efforts. This suggests that our results should indicate something of a bias in favor of a finding that the deterrence strategy has been successful. As we find little evidence of deterrence, this type of response bias is not cause for major concern.
Results

Table 2 presents the results of the logit models. In model 1, we include only our demographic and economic control variables. This model confirms the expectation that migrants are more likely to be men of working age. The coefficient for gender is negative and significant, indicating that women are less likely than men to cross, and the parabolic age and age-squared terms indicate that the very young and very old are least likely to attempt a crossing. Interestingly, marital status and number of children do not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of migrating. We also find that people who report a higher economic status are more likely to migrate. We suspect that this may be because such persons have better means to migrate – for example, paying smuggler’s fees or obtaining legal documents – and/or because of possible reverse causation. People who have migrated in the past may have earned money in the USA to support their current lifestyle and are now considering a repeat visit. Level of education, as our models show, does not have a statistically significant influence on migration propensities.

Models 2–5 sequentially include our main variables of interest. Contrary to the deterrence hypothesis, we find in models 2 and 4 that perceived difficulty evading the border patrol and danger in crossing – although signed negatively – do not have a statistically significant effect on migration decisions. Even more damaging to the deterrence hypothesis, in model 3 we find that individuals who report being well-informed about current Border Patrol efforts are more likely to cross. Additionally, model 5 shows that people who know of someone who died while attempting to cross the border are also more likely to migrate. We believe this result can be easily explained. Persons considering migrating are likely to actively seek information about Border Patrol operations to avoid apprehension. Knowledge of enhanced enforcement is not deterring these people, but is instead leading them to devise better evasion strategies. Moreover, we would expect those planning to go north to have many experienced migrants in their network of friends and family; therefore, they are more likely to know of someone who died while trying to enter the USA. Whereas the risk of death is very real, with thousands of successful crossings being made each day, border-wide, prospective migrants view the probability of dying to be acceptably low. Model 6 includes all of these variables in a single regression and comes to a similar conclusion.10

In Table 3, we restrict the analysis to those migrants who have crossed before. Perhaps perceptions of danger or difficulty are not sufficient; actual experiences in previous crossing attempts may be a more potent deterrent. In these models we also include a control variable for previous crossing with legal documents; not surprisingly, people who were able to enter the USA legally in the past are much more likely to cross. Interestingly, in these models we find that marital status is now statistically significant, with married people being less likely to migrate again. Economic status is no longer significant although we note a moderate degree of correlation between this variable and legal status.

Model 7 shows that people who report having been caught in the past are somewhat less likely to indicate an intention to migrate again in 2005. Although this provides some evidence of a deterrent effect, the result barely reaches statistical significance at the 0.1 level. To get a sense of the substantive impact of this effect, we compute predicted probabilities based upon these estimates by setting all dichotomous variables to zero and all continuous variables to their means. Changing the "caught" variable from zero (not caught) to one (caught) reduces the expected probability of migrating by roughly 8%. To put this in context, our models also show that women are 10% less likely to migrate than men and that married people are 17% less likely to migrate to the USA than singles. Therefore, the influence of border enforcement is substantively small compared to other factors. Model 8 includes our variable for experience of difficulty during crossing. Although this variable has a negative sign, we do not find a statistically significant effect.
Conclusion

The main justification for the strategy of border control implemented by the USA since 1993 was that it would deter undocumented migration at the source, in Mexico and other migrant-sending countries. Although higher wages and abundant job opportunities in the USA constitute powerful economic incentives, a robust border enforcement strategy was expected to limit access to the US labor market, making unauthorized migration less attractive. Whereas our research design does not enable us to compare migration propensities before and after new border controls were introduced, our results suggest that perceptions of the danger and difficultly involved in clandestine crossings have not discouraged migrants from attempting them. Political restrictions on immigration are far outweighed by economic and family-related incentives to migrate.

Our survey and qualitative research in Mexican migrant-sending communities in 2005–2006 indicates that migration strategies have been affected by enhanced border security. For example, border-crossing points have changed, the use of people-smugglers continues to increase, and unauthorized migrants are now more likely to seek entry through legal ports of entry. But few potential migrants are staying home primarily as a consequence of US border enforcement efforts. We also find that migrants who do go to the border have an extremely high rate of success if they persist. Among migrants interviewed in our 2005 survey, 92% of those who were apprehended at least once on their most recent trip to the border eventually were able to gain entry, without returning to their place of origin (Cornelius & Lewis 2006, p. 65). Among those interviewed in our 2006 survey, conducted in a rural community in the state of Yucatán, 97% of those apprehended on their most recent trip were able to enter successfully on the second or third try (Cornelius et al. 2007, Ch. 5).

From a policy standpoint, our findings suggest that current US immigration control policy is fundamentally flawed. The stated aim of reducing the flow and stock of unauthorized immigrants through a robust deterrence strategy has not been achieved. Ignoring this policy failure, in September 2006 the US Congress passed an immigration control bill that focuses exclusively on border enforcement – particularly the construction of new fencing and installation of high-tech detection hardware along 700 miles of the US–Mexico border – without addressing the root causes of migration. But additional investment of taxpayer dollars in a border enforcement-centered strategy of immigration control, leaving intact the employer demand for unauthorized immigrant labor, is unlikely to create an effective deterrent to unauthorized migration. An alternative approach, that is, increasing legal entry opportunities for low-skilled foreign workers through a guestworker program and/or providing a larger number of permanent, employment-based visas for such workers, would have a higher probability of success. By bringing the supply and demand for immigrant labor into equilibrium, the incentives for undocumented migration – essentially a black market for labor – would largely disappear.

Immigration Issues

2008-04-30T01:40:00.000-07:00

There are countless things to read on immigration because it is a very contested topic in society today. Here are a few articles though on the lack of enforcement of the law that should be disciplining the employers of illegal immigrants as well as information on the decline in jobs for day laborers.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89953759

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89388156

Evo Morales on The Daily Show w/Jon Stewart

2008-04-25T13:34:00.000-07:00

Hey, here's the link.

http://www.thedailyshow.com/video/index.jhtml?videoId=103275&title=president-evo-morales

:)

Enjoy!

Madison

Brazil President Defends Biofuels

2008-04-16T20:01:00.000-07:00

By Emilio San Pedro
BBC Americas editor

Brazil's President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has rejected allegations that biofuels are responsible for the recent rise in global food prices.

He said food had become more expensive because people in developing countries were gaining greater access to it.

Mr Lula was speaking at a conference of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in Brasilia.

A chorus of opposition to bio-fuels has been growing in different parts of the world in recent months.

Environmental groups, government ministers and even world leaders like President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela have all voiced their concerns that the use of crops like sugar-cane and corn to make fuel for cars could lead to a serious food crisis.

'Crime against humanity'

Critics claim biofuels are also partly responsible for the recent rise in global food prices.

And Jean Ziegler, the UN's Special Rapporteur for Food Rights and a Swiss national, has described biofuel production of bio-fuels as a crime against humanity.

President Lula, whose country is the world's largest exporter of biofuels such as ethanol, said it was easy for someone sitting in Switzerland to preach to Brazil.

He said allegations that global food prices were rising because of biofuels were baseless.

"Biofuels aren't the villain that threatens food security," said President Lula.

"On the contrary... they can pull countries out of energy dependency without affecting foods."

Food prices were going up, he said, because people in developing countries like China, India and Brazil itself were simply eating more as their economic conditions improved.

The president has signed several important cooperation deals with the US, another leading biofuels producer, as well as with several African countries, to work together to improve production.

The battle against biofuels has united a dichotomous group ranging from environmental activists to the leaders of some of the world's largest oil producing countries.

Posted by April Griffith

Brazil's New Oil Find

2008-04-16T13:28:00.000-07:00

A new oil field has been discovered off the coast of Brazil. Heraldo Lima, the head of the country’s National Petroleum Agency has announced that it may be the third biggest oil field in the world, but the agency itself has since distanced itself from his claims. More drilling and studies need to be conducted to determine the number of barrels that can be extracted from the region, but in any case, it should turn out be a superfield of at least 5 billion barrels. This would boost Brazil up to the 7th largest oil producer in the world. Traditionally Brazil has been overlooked as a major oil producer because of larger energy providers in the region such as Mexico and Venezuela. Brazil is also at the center of the bio-fuel revolution, currently exporting corn-based ethanol. The new find will therefore bring a lot of political and economic changes to the country.

You can read more about it here:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/apr/16/oil.brazil

http://www.forbes.com/energy/2008/04/15/oil-brazil-carioca-biz-energy-cx_pm_0415notes.html

The Brazilian MST and some of its developments

2008-04-16T11:44:00.000-07:00

Hello class,
Posted below are links to online articles I found regarding the MST Brazilian Landless Workers Movement. Two of the first two link articles are interviews with João Pedro Stédile, one of the leaders of the MST. The third article link describes a brief overview of some of the violence which has resulted from opponents of the MST. The last article link describes a current development of the MST, the "Red April" protest in Brazilia (a push for more farm land). Feel free to comment on these articles or address discussion questions regarding the topic.

http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=48&ItemID=7036

http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=48&ItemID=4003

http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/brazil/mst1.html

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080415/bs_afp/brazilsocialfarmprotest_080415071614

Chilean Hunger Strike for Indigenous Rights

2008-04-13T21:58:00.000-07:00

I think that there are a few interesting articles about the hunger strike in Chile over indigenous Mapuche rights. The 111-day hunger strike ended in January, but the effects and reactions are very interesting. Hope everyone enjoys

http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=40992

http://www.mapuche-nation.org/english/html/news/n-118.htm

Event: Current political situation in Oaxaca and the role of women in the movement for social justice in Oaxaca

2008-04-09T20:27:00.001-07:00

Please see attach information: bio, tour schedule

The Binational Struggle of the Mexican Indigenous Migrant communities: A Oaxacan Perspective Tour.”
Two prominent grassroots indigenous Oaxacan leaders, from the Indigenous Organizations Binational Front will give a talk on:

Current political situation in Oaxaca and the role of women in the movement for social justice in Oaxaca

Centolia Maldonado Vásquez Bernardo Ramírez Bautista

Sunday April 13, 2008
4:00- 7:00 PM
Pico Shalom Ministries community center
1320 South New Hampshire
Los Angeles California
213-447-6248

Come and support our fundraising efforts there will be food, raffles
There will be sale of Handicrafts & Organic Spices by the Triqui Communities.
“For respect to the rights of indigenous peoples”

**********************************************************************************************************

Frente Indígena de Organizaciones Binacionales

Presenta su gira:
Presenta su gira: LA lucha binacional de Indígenas migrantes mexicanos desde la perspectiva oaxaqueña
Dos prominentes líderes indigena darán un informe sobre:
La situación política actual de Oaxaca y el rol de la mujer en el movimiento social de Oaxaca.

Centolia Maldonado Vásquez Bernardo Ramírez Bautista
Domingo Abril 13, 2008
4:00- 7:00 PM
Pico Shalom Ministries community center
1320 South New Hampshire
Los Ángeles California
213-447-6248

Venga a apoya nuestra evento comunitario y recaudación de fondos
Venta de comida, rifas

Abra ventas de artesanía y especies orgánicos producido por las comunidades
“Por los derechos de los pueblos indígenas.”

"Por el respeto a los derechos de los pueblos indígenas"
Odilia Romero Hernández
Coordinadora de la Mujer-Consejo Central Binacional
Frente Indígena de Organizaciones Binacionales (FIOB)
www.fiob.org
Oficina Los Ángeles
2936 West 8th Street Suite 303
Los Angeles, Ca 90005
213-251-8481
213-251-8444 FAX
323-806-2198

Social Movements in Oaxaca: Event in Los Angeles

2008-04-09T20:11:00.000-07:00

The Tribal Learning Community & Education Exchange (TLCEE), the César E. Chávez Department of Chicana/o Studies, Critical Race Studies and the Raza Grad Student Association welcome....

Centolia Maldonado Vásquez and Bernardo Ramírez Bautista

Two prominent grassroots indigenous Oaxacan leaders from the
Indigenous Organization Binational Front
(Frente Indígena de Organizaciones Binacionales-FIOB)
who will speak on:

Monday, April 14, 2008
2:00-3:30 pm
Law 1347 UCLA

Centolia Maldonado Vásquez is currently the District Coordinator and Director of Economic Development Projects of the FIOB in Juxtlahuaca, Oaxaca. Centolia is also member of the outreach committee of ECOMIX (Espacio de Economías Solidarias) a state-wide NGO that provides technical assistance to grassroots organizations in Oaxaca. Centolia's organizational experiences, particularly with women, have been documented in Sueños Binacionales and Mujeres que se Organizan Avanzan.

Bernardo Ramírez Bautista, an indigenous lawyer, is the Regional Coordinator of the FIOB in the Mixteca region. He is also the Director of the Justice Advocacy Program (Procuración de Justicia) for indigenous communities in Oaxaca and coordinates the program- Leadership Development for Traditional Indigenous- for elected officials at the municipal and local levels.

For more information regarding this event, please contact professor Maylei Blackwell at maylei@chavez.ucla.edu

Eleuteria Hernández G.
Student Affairs Officer
UCLA César E. Chávez Department of Chicana/o Studies
Spring Office Hours: Every day from 11-1:00 & 2-5:00 pm

310.206.7696
fax: 310.825.2449
7351 Bunche Hall
lute@chavez.ucla.edu
http://www.chavez.ucla.edu

Late notice, but...

2008-04-04T13:30:00.000-07:00

I know it's late notice, but in case anyone is interested....

Hugo Chavez and the "Bolivarian Revolution" in Venezuela.

Challenges, Contradictions, and Prospects for Liberation: Two Contending
Views.

Presentations by:

George Ciccariello-Maher, author of Monthly Review article: "Dual Power in
the Venezuelan Revolution"

- and -

Raymond Lotta, author of "America in Decline", Maoist political economist,
and contributor to "Revolution" newspaper.

Friday, April 4 at 3pm
Barrows Hall, Room 554

Best, Andrea G.

Cuba puts unused land to work for farming

2008-04-01T21:51:00.000-07:00

HAVANA, Cuba (AP) -- Cuba is lending unused land to private farmers and cooperatives as part of a sweeping effort to revitalize a floundering agricultural sector and step up food production.

Government television said Tuesday that 51 percent of arable land is underused or fallow, a problem officials hope to rectify by temporarily transferring some of it to private farmers and associations representing small, private producers.

The president of Cuba's national farmers association, Orlando Lugo, said "everyone who wants to produce tobacco will be given land to produce tobacco," and it will be the same for coffee or anything else.

The government began dolling out land last year, but announced the program this week.

It was not clear how much land had been transferred and under what terms.

With His Star Rising, Mexican Populist Faces New Tests

2008-03-18T19:23:00.000-07:00

With His Star Rising, Mexican Populist Faces New Tests
By GINGER THOMPSON

EXICO CITY, May 3 - He is mayor of the largest city in the hemisphere, and this country's latest political phenomenon.

He can summon tens of thousands into the streets at will. In a whirlwind three weeks he staged the biggest protest in Mexico's recent history and turned back a legal challenge from the Mexican president and Congress that threatened to end his political career.

Now Andrés Manuel López Obrador is considered the favorite to be elected president next year.

"What we saw last Sunday was proof that this is a new society," the mayor said during an interview last week, referring to the protest march, "that the traditional structures of power are not in control, not even with all their money and media."

Indeed, while Mr. López Obrador, a 51-year-old widower and father of three sons, has proven that he can motivate this country's vast underclass, what remains unclear is whether he will be able to keep pro-American businesspeople and the fragile middle class on his side.

He is better known for picking political fights than building bridges. And his left-leaning, hard-charging political style has many in the ruling elite and analysts abroad worried that Mexico could go the way of Venezuela, which is embroiled in a class war as President Hugo Chávez rides a wave of anti-American sentiment.

It is a wave that has swept leftist politicians into power across Latin America. And like Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil and Tabaré Vásquez of Uruguay, Mr. López Obrador personifies the angry disappointment with Washington-backed promarket economic policies that have stabilized the economy for the rich but failed to lift up the poor. His rise to power would move that frustration to the United States' door.

In the interview, Mayor López Obrador rejected comparisons to leftist movements across the region. He said he considered himself a purely Mexican phenomenon, shaped by a devout Catholic mother, a devastating family tragedy and a poet who wrote about Mexico's beautiful landscapes and introduced him to this country's grimmest struggles.

At his core, the mayor said, he remains an underdog activist from the tropics, where politics can be a rough-and-tumble affair. But, he said, he has been a player in national politics for nearly a decade, having served as head of the leftist Democratic Revolutionary Party before becoming mayor in 2000.

He pointed to his record as mayor of this monster of a city, pulling out financial statements that showed the lowest debt increases in the last 20 years as proof that he is qualified to run the national economy. He pointed to the nearly one million people who marched on this city last month as a sign that a growing number of Mexicans think so too. "The mentality of the people has changed," he said. "They are willing to stand up for democracy. That's what we were betting on. And we bet right."

Indeed, the embattled mayor, known in Mexico - J.F.K.-like - as AMLO, defies easy labels. He holds daily news conferences at 6:30 a.m., but brushes off most substantive questions and has blocked enforcement of freedom of information laws.

He has been criticized by conservatives for spending lavishly on welfare for the elderly, a shelter for prostitutes too old to work and double-decker freeways to ease traffic. He rattled the left when he blocked laws that would have legalized gay unions, forged agreements with business tycoons to restore this city's historic center and brought former Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani of New York to help design zero-tolerance crime policies.

And in what even his closest aides considered a major blunder that alienated the middle class, he said the organizers of a citizens' march against crime were pawns in a right-wing conspiracy against him.

Like almost every other political leader in this country, Mr. López Obrador started out in the authoritarian Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, which dominated the government for more than seven decades. His supporters point out that he agitated against corruption within that party, then abandoned it to help lead a leftist opposition movement that put Mexico on the road to greater democracy.

Political analysts said the mayor is an expression of the broad disappointment with President Vicente Fox, who has failed to deliver on his sweeping promises for reform; a nostalgia for the firm hand of the PRI; and a reluctance among people to surrender their dreams of change.

"It has been said that López Obrador writes his speeches with his left hand and governs with his right," said Héctor Zagal, co-author of a biography of the mayor. "He's a product of the old PRI, with all its flaws and virtues."

Manuel Camacho Solís, a federal legislator and the mayor's chief political strategist, said: "He is comfortable as a social leader, and he does it well, but he has had to work on learning to govern. To be president he needs to win people's respect through dialogue, not in conflict with them."

Mayor López Obrador did not disagree. "There is the impression that I am authoritarian," he said. "But social movements require strong leadership. This fight is very hard. And at times it hardens the heart, but not forever."

Clues about the mayor, named for his father, Andrés, and his mother, Manuela, are scattered across the southern state of Tabasco. He was born in a tiny town, called Tepetitan, which feels nothing like the city he governs today.

Children play ball in the middle of cornfields and scruffy fishermen like Felipe López González quote scripture from the New Testament as they explain how the average family lives close to this country's richest oil fields on less than $4 a day.

Poverty seemed a passing matter to the young Mr. López Obrador, something he heard about from the men and women who could not pay their tabs at his family's general store. Then, in 1969, that idyllic life was shattered when one of his younger brothers, José Ramón, was killed playing with a pistol when it fired.

Andrés Manuel, 15 at the time, watched it happen. Relatives said he had tried to get his brother to put the gun away.

In the interview, the mayor declined to talk about it or the speculation by some here that the trauma of that shooting gave his politics a messianic zeal. "It affected me and still affects me," he said.

Perhaps the experience that changed him most came years later in the Indian town of Tucta, which he helped raise from a swamp. He first laid eyes on the village in 1976 in the company of Carlos Pellicer Cámara, one of Mexico's most beloved poets.

It was a place that seemed lost in time. The Chontal Indians, descendants of the Maya, had no electricity or clean water. There were no schools or clinics. People lived in huts made from branches and leaves.

"Not only did they have the Chontales stuck out in the margins of society," Mr. López Obrador recalled, referring to government authorities, "they denied that the Chontales existed, even though they are the most intimate reality of Tabasco."

The Indians quickly became an intimate reality for Mr. López Obrador. He moved his wife and baby son into a shack in Tucta with dirt floors and a thatched roof, and - much as he has done in Mexico City - began a combination of welfare and public works programs to help meet people's basic needs and create jobs.

"He could have had a comfortable life with his family, but he brought them here to be with us," said Pedro Bernardo, 58, one of the beneficiaries of Mr. López Obrador's work in Tucta. "There are few people who could endure the blows of this life."

There were even tougher blows to come.

"My dream was to become the governor of Tabasco," Mr. López Obrador said, "because I wanted to change it." It was a dream that would elude him.

Mr. López Obrador abandoned the PRI and then set out to topple it in 1988 when the party refused to run him for mayor of the municipality of Macuspana.

Backed by a peasant political base that he commanded like a general, the firebrand politician ran twice for governor on leftist tickets and lost both times. The elections in 1994 were marred by allegations of corruption. And for several months, Mr. López Obrador and his civilian troops protested every way they could to make the state ungovernable.

Two years later he was at it again, leading thousands of supporters against more than 50 oil wells across the state to protest spills by the government-owned oil company that had contaminated rivers and farmland.

The protests caused the company to lose some $8.5 million in revenues in the first 12 days. Dozens of people were hurt and arrested as the police tried to clear a way to the wells.

In the interview last week, Mr. López Obrador took delight in his old war stories. The principles of those battles still guide him, he said, but his radical days are over.

"I'm a centrist now," he said, with a wry smile.

"When we started, the PRI dominated completely," he said. "Not even the leaves of the trees moved unless the PRI said so.

"A lot of time had to pass before people began to live their freedom. It was up to us to teach them not to be afraid.

"They are not afraid anymore."

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
posted by Hyo Jeong "Sara" Kim

Seeking Justice in Guatemala

2008-03-17T00:13:00.000-07:00

Seeking justice in Guatemala
By Piers Scholfield
BBC News, Guatemala City

"A paradise for organised crime," is how the Dutch ambassador recently described Guatemala.

Teunis Kamper made the comment at a news conference where he handed over a cheque for some $2.7m (£1.35m) to help fund the United Nations-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG).

Carlos Castresana is the Spanish prosecutor appointed by UN Secretary General Ban-ki Moon to head the commission and he has a big job ahead of him.

There were some 6,000 murders in Guatemala in 2007, of which only about 100 made it to court.

This near-total absence of justice can be seen largely as a hangover from Guatemala's long civil war that ended only 12 years ago.

Restoring trust

Mr Castresana's team is already up and running and aims to have a full contingent of 150 international and Guatemalan investigators in place by July.

The main objective as Mr Castresana sees it is to start the process of restoring trust in institutions such as the police and judiciary.

These are beset by corruption and perceived by many to be not only involved, but often to be instrumental, in many of the killings.

One of the key tasks of the commission is to identify the existence of illegal security groups and their possible links to the state.

This is probably the most difficult part of the mandate, says Mr Castresana.

"We must work with the institutions and the institutions are obviously infiltrated, so it's very easy for us to be infiltrated at the same time," he says.

"But it is part of the challenge. We need to work with these institutions even if they are infiltrated, even if they are corrupted, and try to make them useful for the citizens."

Bus drivers

Carlos Castresana is no stranger to high-profile cases, which have included indictments against the late Chilean leader General Augusto Pinochet and a network of Italian Mafia leaders.

In Guatemala, he has been prominent in the media, a sign of the importance the country is attaching to the CICIG.

But Mr Castresana says the commission cannot be a magic solution.

"Reform of the institutions is not our mandate because we have neither the personal resources nor the time," he says. "What we can do is create small units inside the bodies to be the beginning of change.

"The change that Guatemala needs can only be made by Guatemalans themselves."

The CICIG has an initial two-year mandate, which can be renewed if both sides are in favour.

"I hope we're going to take care of it so we can thank CICIG and they can go to another country, but we'll keep them as long as we need them. We're going to learn from them and hopefully in a short period of time we can do it ourselves," says Vice President Rafael Espada.

So far, Mr Castresana and his team have agreed to take on two investigations suggested by the government.

One relates to the killing of women, which is all too common in Guatemala. Mr Castresana is confident of some success here.

"If you are able to put together to work all the social, health and educational services, you can prevent most cases of gender violence," he says.

The second investigation comes from a direct appeal by President Alvaro Colom for help with the case of a dozen murdered bus drivers.

They were all killed in Guatemala City in the space of two days in early February.

The killings caused chaos in the sprawling capital and most people are convinced it was a deliberate attempt to destabilise the new government, which took office in January.

"They were very intelligent people with a good organisation from the military point of view. I'm not saying they're military people, but they have a well organised system which makes them very effective and difficult to get at," Mr Espada said.

'Too close'

Mr Castresana had no hesitation in taking on this case as it will clearly help the CICIG fulfil one of its main investigating aims.

But analysts say the commission's ability to examine these groups might already have been compromised.

Frank LaRue is a leading human rights lawyer and, as human rights commissioner in the previous government, helped set up the commission.

He says some of those who should be investigated are already too close to government.

"This government has remilitarised many of the civilian structures that should remain civilian... and they have chosen military people with questionable records in terms of corruption or connections to organised crime," he says.

"We're now living a process of remilitarisation which will make CICIG's job more difficult."

Mr Espada rejects this with a swipe at the previous government.

"They didn't have any military intelligence at all so they were extremely open to a lot of errors. The military people that are working with us are very good military people with very clean records," he says.

Guatemala is not the only country facing high levels of impunity.

CICIG could serve as a model for other countries in the region, many with weak institutions, as well as post-conflict nations in Africa or the Middle East.

As for Guatemala, MrCastresana is unsure about the immediate future.

"We're beginning almost from zero so every result we can get will be an improvement," he says.

So for now the world looks on to see what impact Carlos Castresana and his team can have.

Posted by April Griffith, March 17, 2008

The International Reach of the Mara Salvatrucha by Mandalit del Barco

2008-03-11T20:24:00.000-07:00

Check out this link to listen to the story on npr

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4539688

The Case for CAFTA Consolidating CEntral America's Freedom Revolution

2008-03-10T13:39:00.000-07:00

by Daniel Griswold and Daniel Ikenson

Executive Summary
The next major trade agreement likely to come before Congress will be the Central American Free Trade Agreement. The agreement would eliminate almost all trade barriers between the United States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and also the Dominican Republic.

If approved, CAFTA would establish free trade with nearby countries that together make up the United States' 13th-largest trading partner and second-largest export market in Latin America, behind only Mexico. Upon implementation, goods in 98 percent of the product categories from which the CAFTA countries could export to the United States would enter duty-free. For U.S. companies, CAFTA would offer guaranteed reciprocal access for our most competitive exports, including agricultural products.

Two glaring exceptions to free trade in the agreement are sugar and apparel. CAFTA grudgingly expands the existing quota on sugar imports from the region, denying U.S. consumers and sugar-using industries the benefits of lower prices. Its apparel provisions contain restrictive "rules of origin" requiring use of U.S.-made textiles, which will add to the cost of production in the region and ultimately undermine demand for U.S. inputs. Nonetheless, CAFTA marks a major step toward liberalizing trade.

CAFTA would enhance important U.S. foreign policy goals by promoting freedom and democracy in a region that has been troubled in the recent past by wars and political oppression. Today, all six CAFTA partners are democracies pursuing political, economic, and trade reforms.

Objections that the agreement does not adequately protect environmental and labor standards are unwarranted. All six countries have adopted laws consistent with core labor standards as established through the International Labor Organization. All six have made measurable progress on a range of social indicators. Promoting trade and development through CAFTA would further that progress.

To check out the rest of the Trade Briefing Paper go to http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/briefs/tbp-021.pdf

Neoliberalism, the global elite, and the Guatemalan transition: A critical macrosocial analysis by Robinson, William I

2008-03-10T13:07:00.000-07:00

Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs Winter 2000

The trajectory of social change in Central America and Latin America in recent decades and, beyond that, the transformations in the global system are the "big picture" that puts into a larger focus issues of democratization and development in Guatemala. Recent change in Guatemala is part of a complex transition that began in Central America in the 1960s and will continue into the twenty-first century. This process involves the region's ongoing, gradual, highly conflictive, and contradictory entrance into the emergent global economy and society.

Central America is an important site of transnational processes, particularly the unfolding of a hegemonic, transnational agenda of neoliberalism and polyarchy. Transnational processes are defined as the economic and concomitant social, political, and cultural changes associated with incorporation into global economy and society. This essay reassesses the Central American conflict in light of these processes, with a synopsis of the globalization process in each country and a deeper examination of Guatemala.

The central argument here is that the transnational model of society in the Isthmus is inherently unstable and indicates contradictions internal to global capitalism, including social polarization between the rich and the poor, the loss of nation-state autonomy and regulatory power, and the deterioration of the social fabric in civil society, accompanied by crises of authority and state legitimacy. The Guatemalan elite's resistance to such reforms as changes in the tax system creates the image of the transnational project as progressive and obscures the essential polarizing and pauperizing consequences of neoliberalism. The constraints of the exclusionary socioeconomic system undermine efforts to open up the political system as contemplated in the 1996 Guatemalan peace accord. Authentic democratization requires a radical redistribution of wealth and power toward the poor majority; but the peace accord ratifies existing property relations and rules out such a redistribution.

GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND THE AGENDA OF THE TRANSNATIONAL ELITE
Globalization entails the transition from the nation-state phase of capitalism to a qualitatively new transnational phase.' Since 1492, the world has been linked into a single social system by trade and financial flows in an integrated international market. But from the late 1960s on-and accelerating now as the twenty-first century opens-this world economy is giving way to a new global economy. In this global economy, nations are no longer linked by external flows and relations but integrated organically through the globalization of the production process itself, along with the integration of the whole social, political, juridical, and cultural superstructure. The emergence of a truly global economy brings with it the material basis for the emergence of a single global society, including the transnationalization of civil society, of political processes, and of cultural life.

The global mobility of capital has allowed for the decentralization and functional integration around the world of vast chains of production and distribution, the instantaneous movement of values, and the unprecedented concentration and centralization of worldwide economic management, control, and decisionmaking power in transnational capital. Global capitalism is organized in a set of increasingly supranational institutions. These institutions include the transnational corporations that own and manage the world's resources and appropriate the wealth produced by humanity; the international financial agencies (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, that impose the conditions necessary for global capital accumulation to take place; the states of the North and their junior counterparts of the South, which create the global and local political, administrative, and legal environment that allow the system to function; and the formal and informal transnational elite forums, such as the Group of Seven, the Trilateral Commission, and the World Economic Forum, that develop strategies to maintain and reproduce the system and supervise its overall operation.

The agent of the global economy is a new transnational elite. This group now controls global decisionmaking and increasingly monopolizes power in the global society. It comprises the owners and managers of the transnational corporations and also the bureaucrats, cadres, and technicians who administer the IFIs, the North and South state bureaucracies, and the transnational forums. Its membership includes the politicians and charismatic figures of public life and the mass media, along with select organic intellectuals, who provide ideological legitimacy and technical solutions for this new global order.
Below this transnational elite in the global hierarchy is a small and shrinking layer of middle classes, who exercise very little real power but who-pacified with mass consumption-form a fragile buffer between the transnational elite and the world's poor majority. Globalization dramatically alters the balance of forces among classes and social groups in each nation, at a level of the global system farther from popular majorities and closer to transnational capital and its representatives. National states increasingly respond to the interests of transnationalized fractions of locally dominant groups.

The transnational elite's program, in broad strokes, is to create the conditions most propitious to the unfettered functioning of global capitalism. In promoting this program, this new global elite has been pursuing a "transnational agenda," involving concomitant economic and political components, in every region of the world since the mid-1980s (Robinson 1996a, b, c, 1997). The economic component is neoliberalism, a model that seeks to achieve the conditions in each country and region for the mobility and free operation of capital. The neoliberal structural adjustment programs sweeping Latin America and the South in general seek macroeconomic stability as an essential requisite for the activity of transnational capital. This model aims to harmonize a wide range of fiscal, monetary, industrial, and commercial policies among many nations as a requirement for fully mobile transnational capital to function simultaneously, and often instantaneously, among numerous national borders.
In the neoliberal model, stabilization, or the package of fiscal, monetary, exchange, and related measures intended to achieve macroeconomic stability, is followed by "structural adjustment," which includes several components: liberalization of trade and finances, which opens the economy to the world market; deregulation, which removes the state from economic decisionmaking (but not from activities that service capital); and privatization of formerly public spheres that could hamper capital accumulation if criteria of public interest over private profit are left operative. This model thus generates the overall conditions for the profitable ("efficient") renewal of capital accumulation through new, globalized circuits, and, along with them, the conditions for social reproduction in the age of globalization. Neoliberal restructuring often results in an increase in poverty and inequality in the adjusted country as wealth is redistributed upward and shifted from the domestic market to the external sector linked to the global economy (Green 1995; Overbeek 1993; Robinson 1999). The unprecedented growth of inequalities worldwide under globalization, along with the emergence of new social hierarchies and cleavages around these inequalities (see, among others, UNDP various years; Korten 1996; Bradshaw and Wallace 1996), is leading to a new global social apartheid and worldwide polarization.

The political component of the project is the promotion of "democracy," or what is more accurately called polyarchy, a system in which a small group actually rules and the majority's participation in decision-- making is confined to choosing among competing elites in tightly controlled electoral processes. This type of "low-intensity democracy" does not involve power (craters) of the people (demos), much less an end to elite rule or to substantive inequality. The crisis of elite rule that developed throughout the Third World in the 1970s and 1980s in the context of globalization was resolved through transitions to polyarchies.

What transpired in these contested transitions was an effort by transnationally dominant groups to reconstitute hegemony through a change in the mode of political domination, from the coercive systems of social control exercised by authoritarian and dictatorial regimes to more consensually based systems of the new polyarchies. At stake was the type of social order-the emergent global capitalist order or some popular alternative-that would emerge in the wake of authoritarianism. The masses pushed for a deeper popular democratization while emergent transnationalized elites-backed by the structural power of the global economy and the inordinate political and ideological influence it brings, and often aided by direct U.S. political and military intervention-gained hegemony over democratization movements and steered the breakup of authoritarianism into polyarchic outcomes.

The transnational elite is now attempting to consolidate fragile polyarchic systems as the political counterpart to neoliberalism. Interaction and economic integration on a world scale are obstructed by authoritarian or dictatorial political arrangements, which cannot manage the expansion of social intercourse associated with the global economy. With its mechanisms for intraelite compromise and accommodation and for hegemonic incorporation of popular majorities, polyarchy is better equipped to legitimate the political authority of dominant groups and to achieve the political stability necessary for global capitalism to operate. The "democratic consensus" in the new world order is a consensus among an increasingly cohesive global elite on the type of political system most propitious to the reproduction of social order in the new global environment.
In Latin America, the transitions from authoritarianism to polyarchy gave functionaries from the IFIs, donor governments, corporate groups, and representatives of transnationalized fractions of the local elite the transnational elites the opportunity to reorganize state institutions and create a more favorable institutional framework for deepening the neoliberal adjustment. With few exceptions, Latin America's new polyarchic regimes, staffed by state managers (the new "modernizers" and "technocrats"), have pursued profound neoliberal transformation. The transnational elite has demonstrated a remarkable ability to wield the structural power of transnational capital over individual countries like a sledgehammer against popular grassroots movements for social change. Indeed, it is global capitalism's power to impose discipline through the market that (usually) obviates the all-pervasive coercive forms of political authority exercised by authoritarian regimes.

TRANSNATIONAL PROCESSES IN CENTRAL AMERICA
The underlying macrostructural dynamic in individual nations and regions over the past few decades has been integration into emergent global society. This has involved the breakup of national economic, political, and social systems, reciprocal to the breakup of the preglobalization, nation-state-based world order. This process of integration into changing world structures takes place through what elsewhere I have termed transnational processes (Robinson 1997, 1998b). Transnational processes are the economic and concomitant social, political, and cultural changes associated with the transition to global capitalism. Transnational processes in Central America should be seen as changes specific to the region that are linked to broader changes in the global system.

One type of change is that productive structures are reorganized, in tandem with the reorganization of global production. Each national economy is rearticulated to the global economy as new economic activities linked to globalization come to dominate and as each region acquires a new profile in the global system. There is also a complete class restructuring. Domestic classes tend to become globalized, preglobalization classes such as peasantries and artisans tend to disappear, and new classes and class fractions linked to the global economy emerge and become dominant. The transnational agenda of neoliberalism and polyarchy take hold as the hegemonic project, under the guidance of transnationalized fractions of local elites. Local political systems and civil societies become transnationalized, and states become integrated externally into supranational institutions and forums, which gradually assume functions that corresponded to the nation-state before globalization. A "global culture" of hyperindividualism, competition, and consumerism eclipses nationalist and developmental ideologies.

We see all these changes in Central America, and more broadly throughout Latin America, as transnational processes have taken hold over the past two decades. Facilitated by the neoliberal opening to the global economy and the export-led development (ELD) strategy, maquiladora production (particularly of garments), tourism, nontraditional agricultural exports, and remittances from emigrant workers have risen dramatically in importance and are coming to eclipse the traditional agroexport model as the most dynamic economic sectors linking Central America to globalized circuits of production and distribution (Robinson 1998). The Central American peasantry, artisans, national industrial, and other preglobalization classes have shown signs of gradual disintegration, and three principal groups have come to the fore: transnationalized fractions of the bourgeoisie tied to the new economic activities, new urban and rural working classes, and a new class of supernumeraries, or superfluous labor pools. (A huge portion of the last has migrated to the United States, where it constitutes a denationalized immigrant labor pool.)

The old authoritarian regimes have crumbled through transitions to polyarchy, and leftist movements that in the 1980s posed an antisystemic alternative to global integration have been defeated or transformed. In each Central American country, a transnationalized "technocratic" or New Right fraction has gained hegemony within the dominant classes. This fraction is pushing the transnational agenda of neoliberalism and the consolidation of polyarchies through diverse institutions, including states, political parties, and other organs of civil society.

Neoliberal structuring has resulted in a massive transfer of resources from the public to the private sphere and, within the private sphere, from the domestic to the external sector. The change in the model of accumulation has thus involved a concomitant change from the "developmentalist state" of the national model to the "neoliberal state" of the transnational model.

The five Central American states have moved gradually toward supranational integration. Politically, this integration is taking place through forums such as the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN), regular presidential summits, and regionwide ministerial meetings. Economically, it includes the negotiation of a new free trade zone based on collective integration into the North American Free Trade Agreement. If the Central American Common Market (CACM) was a form of "inward" integration, intended to create a regional market for multinational (largely U.SJ capital to take advantage of economies of scale, the more recent sets of international agreements represent an "outward" integration, aimed at creating a single Central American field for the unfettered operation of transnational capital.

The IFIs, various agencies of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and other transnational actors, including the U.S. Agency for International Development and international nongovernmental organizations (often linked to the national states of core countries), have increasingly assumed the functions of states through the design and imposition of economic policies, management of peace accords, sponsorship of institution building, and other activities. In this process, each Central American state has been penetrated by two new social forces, one from "within" and the other from "outside." From within, transnationalized fractions of dominant groups vie for and gain control over local states, particularly over key ministries tying the country to the global economy and society, such as the ministries of foreign affairs, finance, economic development, and central banks. From outside, some of the same transnational actors representing an emergent transnationalized state apparatus penetrate local states, form liaisons with transnationalized fractions therein, and help design and guide local policies.

A REASSESSMENT OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CONFLICT
These vast and open-ended transformations should be seen as the evolving outcome to the struggle among social forces in Central America as collective agents in dialectical interaction with changes in the global system.' In broad terms, three social forces, representing three distinct projects for the region, contended during the upheavals of the 1960s to 1990s. The landed oligarchies and dominant groups tied to the traditional agroexport model sought to sustain and reproduce the old model of capital accumulation and the particular set of social privileges and relations of domination based on authoritarian political systems.3 As the "autumn of the oligarchs" approached, the popular sectors and the mass revolutionary movements sought radical reforms, such as mass land redistribution, along with farther-reaching revolutionary and socialist-oriented alternatives that would have deeply undermined the region's class structure, upset relations of domination, and redistributed power and resources toward popular majorities.

As the regional conflict unfolded in the 1970s and 1980s, it looked on the surface like a bipolar contest between the old oligarchies and the popular revolutionary movements. In reality, however, globalizing dynamics had begun to transform local social forces. A "New Right" gradually cohered in the 1980s, in fits and bouts, into local transnationalized fractions of dominant groups and acquired its own political protagonism.4 Its project was to advance the agenda of the transnational elite. This transnational fraction came into being not from outside the traditional oligarchy but from within, from the same family networks. Its prospects for accumulating wealth and privilege, however, were linked less to restoring the traditional agroexports and industries under pre1980s social relations than to converting the region into a new export platform. It sought to submit backward oligarchic property relations to a capitalist modernization through a program of neoliberal restructuring and to a new "competitive" insertion into the emerging global economy. This New Right project sought to modernize the state and society with no fundamental deconcentration of property and wealth, nor with any class redistribution of political and economic power.

The New Right also promoted, together with the United States, transitions from authoritarian to so-called democratic political systems. The immediate aim was to preempt the movements for farther-reaching popular democratization through immediate reforms, such as the replacement of military by civilian personnel and controlled elections. But beyond this conjunctural consideration, the insertion of the region into global capitalism would require a political system that could promise more lasting social stability through consensual modes of social control rather than the old oligarchic dictatorships. This involved demilitarization, peace negotiations, the institutionalization of procedurally correct electoral processes, states with a functional separation of powers, and so on.

The persistence of an oligarchic political structure, combined with rapid capitalist development, sparked the revolutionary upheavals by the late 1970s. In the 1980s, the revolutionary movements succeeded in momentarily gathering disparite popular social forces into a movement that broke the hegemony of the landed oligarchy, wealthy industrialists, and financial groups that had come into existence with the CAM. The popular social forces, however, could not impose and stabilize a radical redistributive and socialist-oriented reconstruction of the region. One reason was massive U.S. intervention; a second was the revolutionary movement's own contradictions and weaknesses in the context of a changing world order. The latter included an inability to agree on tactics and strategies of the struggle and, more significant, a chronic disunity over the terms of the reconstruction (reflecting, in part, the complexity and the diverse, even antagonistic interests that made up the popular forces). These factors undercut the consolidation of a new, revolutionary bloc. At the structural level, the growing power of transnational capital and the world market to impose discipline on antisystemic movements made the revolutionary project inviable.

The third reason for the failure of the popular movements' plans for reconstruction was the changing composition of the dominant classes, their socioeconomic articulation, and their political-ideological project. The emergence of the neoliberal New Right in the 1980s in each of the Central American countries was partly a result of that very revolutionary upsurge, which altered the dominant power blocs in each country. It was also partly a reflection of a transnational elite that emerged as both a political and an economic protagonist.

These three factors cannot be separated; they are different dimensions of the same globalizing process. It was the threat of revolution from the popular classes that led to U.S. intervention. From the mid1980s on, U.S. policymakers began to redefine, in ad hoc fashion, the objective of interventionism, from a military defeat of revolutionary forces through counterinsurgency to a more thorough political and economic restructuring of the region and its social forces via the link to emergent global structures (Robinson 1996c, esp. chaps. 1, 2, 1996b). This included a shift to "democracy promotion" as a means to neutralize the revolutionary threat through incorporation. The changes in U.S. strategy helped accelerate the articulation of alternative political-ideological discourse and projects among sectors of the dominant groups that would gradually cohere into the New Right elite. The transnational nuclei of the local elite vied for, and achieved, hegemony over the elite as a whole in the 1980s, and went on in the 1990s to assume state power and to attempt to implement the program of global capitalism in the region.
Political regime change in every country except Costa Rica has been one aspect of a broader shift in the nature of political authority and the mode of social control. The recomposition of the capitalist order has involved a new social structure, based on changes in the economy, state, regime, social, and political system.

This analysis runs contrary to conventional thinking, according to which the old oligarchies, by the end of the 1980s, had virtually disappeared, but neither the popular forces nor their adversaries, the newly dominant groups in Central America together with the United States, could prevail. According to this view, the struggle had reached a stalemate that created the conditions for a historic compromise between different class and social forces in favor of a mutual accommodation. Negotiations and peace settlements led to a broad consensus that shifted the region's struggle from the military to the political-civic arena. This shift, in turn, was to be framed by regionwide processes of democratization and demilitarization. Competition between different social projects would now take place through elections and peaceful mobilization.
This writer would argue, in contrast, that the revolutionary upheavals ended not in stalemate and compromise but in the conditional defeat of the broad popular sectors in Central America and the conditional victory of the newly dominant groups. The popular majority was conditionally defeated in what it set about to do-fundamentally alter the social order in its favor. The dominant groups secured control of the project of global capitalism, but have been unable to stabilize that project and achieve its hegemony, in the Gramscian sense.

This outcome was formalized in the internationally sponsored peace negotiations of the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by diverse concertacion and "reconciliation" forums. These meetings transferred social contradictions from the military to the political terrain and hammered out fragile, temporary pacts, but did not resolve the social contradictions that gave rise to the upheaval.

SYNOPSIS OF CHANGE IN EACH COUNTRY
In Nicaragua, the Sandinista triumph of 1979 constituted the seizure of state power in one country by a revolutionary movement and an effort to implement the popular project. The overthrow of the Somocista dictatorship destroyed the traditional oligarchy. But the structural constraints of globalization and the direct power of the U.S. state combined to make unworkable an alternative to polyarchy and global capitalism.

Modernizing capitalist fractions had been coalescing since the mid-1960s and, in opposition to Somoza, had linked with the Sandinistas in 1970s class alliances. These fractions stayed inside Nicaragua following the revolution and retained their links to the international capitalist market. They gradually gained structural strength and political importance in the 1980s, as they increasingly replaced the state as the principal intermediaries between Nicaragua and world markets and developed ties to the emergent U.S.-led transnational elite. In highly simplified terms, a transnationalized fraction took over key institutions of the state following the 1990s elections, even as much of the state, and society at large, was in dispute after 1990. This embryonic transnational nucleus pursued the program of reinserting Nicaragua into the global economy and a far-reaching neoliberal restructuring.

In El Salvador, a massive popular movement burgeoned in the 1970s, and the guerrilla movement snowballed into a full civil war by the early 1980s. While the revolutionary forces eventually threatened state power, the U.S.-led counterinsurgency staved off a triumph similar to that which had taken place in Nicaragua. Behind the highly visible battle between the revolutionary armed movement and the U.S.-supported dominant groups, however, lay a more significant process: the reorganization of the Salvadoran state and economy in conjunction with movement at the level of the global economy, a reconfiguration of the dominant groups, and the emergence of a lucid New Right fraction within the ruling party itself, the Nationalist Revolutionary Alliance (ARENA).

The transnationalized fraction gained control over the ARENA party-which, ironically, had first been formed by the most retrograde elements of the oligarchy-and control of the state with the election of Alfredo Cristiani in 1988. The insurgency, combined with changes in the dominant project itself, shattered the old oligarchy and its project. The insurgent fraction was able to gain hegemony over the elite and over the transition as a whole and to implement sweeping neoliberal transformation after 1988.

In Honduras, both the subordinate and the dominant classes were historically the least developed in Central America. The chaotic disequilibrium among internal social forces from early twentieth century into the 1970s created fertile ground for an unstable string of civilian-military regimes responding to competing pressures of a small landed oligarchy, midsized ranchers, bureaucratic elites, and mass peasant and worker mobilizations. The weakness of Honduran social forces and the state allowed foreign companies to dominate the country, making Honduras the quintessential "banana republic."
A transnational fraction began to cohere in the 1980s in consonance with the virtual U.S. occupation of the country as a staging ground for regional counterinsurgency, U.S. sponsorship of economic development and restructuring programs, and a transition to polyarchy. This fraction gained representation in the National Party through Rafael Callejas, who won the 1989 elections and proceeded with sweeping neoliberal reform, a process continued and deepened by the subsequent Liberal Party government.

In Costa Rica, a very different path of twentieth-century development did not deter the outcome in the 1980s and 1990s of integration into the global economy under terms similar to those of the region as a whole. The hegemony of the landed oligarchy was broken in the 1948 civil war and replaced by an alliance of emergent industrial, commercial, and financial capitalists. This united and relatively modernized dominant class incorporated the peasantry and working classes into a stable hegemonic bloc and established a functioning polyarchic political system. Under the model of import substitution industrialization (ISI) and agroexport expansion, with an important redistributive component and significant levels of social welfare spending, Costa Rica experienced development well beyond that of its neighbors.

By the late 1970s, however, this model of dependent capitalist development had become exhausted. The financial crisis of 1981 gave impetus to a gradual restructuring throughout the 1980s and 1990s, along with the reinsertion of the country's productive apparatus into the emergent global economy. Under close AID tutelage, successive governments oversaw liberalization, austerity, deregulation, privatization, and the development of a ELD model that began to replace the old ISI model. Socioeconomic restructuring generated new entrepreneurial groups within both parties of the elite, the National Liberation Party (PLN) and the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC).

And finally we arrive at Guatemala, which we can now assess in comparative and historical perspective. The traditional agroexport oligarchy was the most deeply entrenched, and it controlled the state-- which was administered directly by the military for much of the 1980s; a transnationalized fraction was the weakest. As in El Salvador, the U.S.-supported Christian Democratic Party, which came to government in the 1980s as part of broader counterinsurgency efforts, was intended to defuse the popular movement with reforms and lead visible transitions to (largely dysfunctional) polyarchy. But the Christian Democratic alternatives were not meant to carry the transnational elite project in the larger scheme of things. With the introduction and expansion of new economic activities in the 1980s-including a powerful new financial sector tied to international banking; incipient export-oriented industry, such as maquila textile production; nontraditional agricultural exports promoted by the IFIs; and new commercial groups-a transnationalized fraction of the elite assumed its own profile and clashed with the old state-protected oligarchy over fiscal, tax, liberalization, and related policies.

This tiny and poorly organized fraction articulated, in the early 1990s, a coherent program for economic and political modernization attuned to the transnational elite agenda, as epitomized, for example, in the policy proposals that flowed out of the influential USAID-funded Association for Research and Social Studies (ASIES). Representatives of this transnationalized fraction, after a false start with the election of Jorge Serrano in 1990, assumed the reins of the government with the electoral triumph in 1994 of the National Action Party (PAN), whose leadership included professionals, administrators, and technocrats schooled in neoliberal economics and a modernizing outlook.

Unlike El Salvador, where the insurgency actually came to dispute state power and constitute a dual power, the Guatemalan insurgency did not threaten the state. But the movement could continue an indefinite insurgency that would make it impossible ever to pacify the countryside and establish the stability that transnational capital required for the country and the region as a whole. The subsequent New Year's Eve 1996 peace accords set the basis for consolidating the transnational elite project for Guatemala. In 1997, the PAN government committed itself to deepening and consolidating a long-term program of neoliberal transformation first launched in 1989 with little success.

The relative strength of the oligarchy and underdevelopment of the transnationalized fraction in the Guatemalan case partly accounts for the tardiness of the transnational project and the severe difficulties of its implementation. The counterrevolution of 1954 and the "counterinsurgency state" that followed gave the oligarchy an internal cohesion that allowed it to resist change in the 1980s (see Jonas 1991).

In comparative perspective, the particular constellation of social forces and historical events in the other Central American countries generated conditions relatively more responsive to the transnational project than those in Guatemala. The old oligarchy was crushed in Nicaragua in 1979, displaced in Costa Rica in 1948, and transformed in Honduras by U.S. intervention and regional dynamics. In El Salvador, U.S. and transnational actors promoted tax, land, and other reforms as a component of the counterinsurgency program-in the process, weakening the old oligarchy and strengthening a transnational fraction-in response to the strength of the revolutionary movement. Guatemala's counterinsurgency rested on postponing any reform; for example, the IFIs did not impose conditionality on Guatemala (Jonas 1991, 81, 88). Counterinsurgency was midwife to the transnational project in El Salvador and an obstacle in Guatemala.

GUATEMALA'S PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
In light of the "big picture" presented here, what are Guatemala's real prospects for democratization and development? To phrase the same question in an entirely different manner is to ask, in the current globalized environment, what sources of power can the Guatemalan popular sectors develop to confront transnational social forces averse to the kinds of structural transformation that could benefit the poor majority? And what policy recommendations would support that process?
It is useful to remember that social change is driven by contradictions that make it impossible to continue an existing set of historical arrangements. The underlying structural dynamics at play in Central America have been a transition to a transnational model of society along with changes in the global system. Yet this globalization of Central America has not resolved the social contradictions that generated the regional upheaval in the first place, and it has simultaneously introduced a new set of contradictions. There has been a continuation-and actually a deepening--from the 1970s to the 1990s, under new circumstances, of an extreme concentration of property and wealth, and of political power, in the hands of tiny minorities, side by side with the impoverishment and powerlessness of a dispossessed majority. (The only exception was Nicaragua, but those changes have been largely reversed.) The lives of the vast majority of Central Americans have grown worse, not better.' The very conditions that gave rise to the Central American crisis in the first place remain, for the most part, unaltered.

The neoliberal model specifically precludes policies, such as agrarian reform and redistributive measures, that could ameliorate current social conditions. The new model of capital accumulation might result in renewed growth in the region: but it is not likely to bring about development, whether this concept is understood in integral terms as a process of social transformation that empowers poor majorities to improve their material and cultural conditions, or even in more narrow terms of a sustainable expansion of productive forces. For instance, the maquiladoras constitute an enclave with little or no backward and forward linkage to host nation economies and very low value added. They characterized by the superexploitation of workers and by conditions of extreme oppression within the free trade zone enclaves. Tourism does stimulate greater local economic activity, but it does not generate integrated development. It is generally low-skill, low-wage, seasonal employment, and it depends on highly elastic and unstable demand, over which host countries have very little control.

Neither do nontraditional agricultural exports (NTAEs) hold much promise for regional development, as several recent studies have shown (Conroy et al. 1996; Barham et al. 1992). It may also be noted that disruption of traditional established communities and contraction of domestic demand accompanies deeper integration into the global economy, a consequence of the internal concentration of wealth and productive resources toward groups tied to the external sector and transnational economic circuits and a greater transfer of wealth out of the country. This results in a shift in the sources of profitability from productive to commercial and financial activities as outlets for investment. Any prospects of authentic development, barring a break with capitalism, must involve restoring the profitability of productive investment. This might require a type of state intervention in the accumulation process that is anathema to the neoliberal model.

The transnational model of society in Central America is inherently unstable, and it indicates contradictions internal to global capitalism, including the worldwide social polarization between rich and poor, the loss of nation-state autonomy and regulatory power, and the deterioration of the social fabric in civil society, accompanied by crises of authority and state legitimacy. The Guatemalan elite's resistance to even the most minimal reforms (such as the tax system) creates the image of the transnational project as "progressive" and obscures the essential polarizing and pauperizing consequences of neoliberalism. Let us recall that the transnational elite wants to stabilize its project in Guatemala not to democratize and develop the country but to secure Central America for global capitalism.

By promoting global capitalism in Guatemala, the transnational elite is antioligarchic, but this should not obscure its overarching project of constructing a neoliberal order in Guatemala. The peace accord was the only instrument available for the transnational elite to push forward its agenda. Implementation of the accord, a prerequisite for stability, sets the entire stage for restructuring the Guatemalan state and society, including relations among dominant groups and fractions, for the larger project of constructing a neoliberal order as part and parcel of the transition. A progressive tax reform could redistribute income downward and finance social spending; but the reform designed by the IFIs proposes indirect taxes levied largely on consumption, in a regressive tax system in which 80 percent of the taxes already comes from indirect levies and only 20 percent from direct taxes on income and wealth (Latin America Data Base 1997).

The IFIs see the tax reform as an essential macroeconomic instrument for resuming transnational capital accumulation in Guatemala and proceeding with a more sweeping adjustment. "The commitment to raise the tax base is not just a hollow demand or capricious recommendation on the international community," explained the World Bank representative in Guatemala, "but rather a fundamental prerequisite for accelerated and equitable economic growth" (Latin America Data Base 1997). The poor and popular classes are thus being asked to finance, through austerity, an accord whose purpose, from the transnational elite's perspective, is to stabilize the country so that a neoliberal order can be constructed.

Similarly, by way of further example, the "land reform" (registry and sale of available private lands) is not intended to benefit the dispossessed rural majority, much less achieve social justice. It is a measure that will further facilitate the transition begun several decades ago to a more fully capitalist agriculture, including a market in land and labor, in the countryside (USAID 1990). In this sense, it is similar to the types of land policies associated with the Green Revolution and with 1960s land reform programs promoted by the capitalist powers in the Third World. These programs were aimed at extending and intensifying capitalist agriculture, including the introduction of the types of agribusiness schemes contemplated for Guatemala. In this way, they resulted in an increased concentration of land, a rise in inequalities, and the proletarianization and further impoverishment of the rural population (McMichael 1996).

It is not clear to what extent the 1996 peace accords can contribute to democratization and development in Guatemala. Those accords could, alternatively, actually end up legitimating the emergent neoliberal order by preventing fundamental change in the socioeconomic system and delegitimating opponents of this system (dispossessed campesino squatters, for instance) as "extremists who reject peace." To the extent that they end some of the most brutal human rights abuses, open up even partial and limited space (polyarchy is preferable to dictatorship), and at least legitimate, if not realize, such demands as indigenous rights, the accords are of major importance. But to argue that in doing these things they pave the way for democracy and development (they do not in themselves) is tautological: parallel reasoning leads to a conclusion that the old dictatorships really paved the way for democracy and development because they generated the social forces and historical conditions that brought about changes such as those contemplated in the accords.

The transnational elite has also disassociated Indian cultural issues from socioeconomic changes and autonomous political power for the indigenous. Moreover, achieving even the limited objectives of the accords has proved elusive. A spate of land invasions that began even before the accords were signed and that intensified throughout 1997 and 1998 was met by forcible evictions, large displays of police power, injuries, and death. In 1998, the government negotiated with international donors a modification of the targets of the peace process regarding tax reform, agrarian policy, justice, rural development, public security, and constitutional reforms affecting the military and the indigenous (Spence et al. 1998; Latin America Data Base 1998). The accords' contribution to democratization and development should be gauged not by what was agreed to on paper but by the extent to which proposed changes are actually implemented and by how much they affect the poor majority.
"Success" in a political endeavor is often defined, from the summits of power, as how broadly the ruling structures are imposed and reproduced, how much accommodation and conformity around these structures is achieved among the different components of the privileged strata, and how much social control is maintained at the base. Authentic democratization in Guatemala would require incorporating the excluded majorities in the vital decisions that affect their lives. It would mean political outcomes in the interests of these majorities, predicated on the construction of a democratic socioeconomic system, and therefore a massive redistribution of political power, in Guatemala and in Central America. Political power, in turn, flows from economic power, and economic power is based on control over society's resources, wealth, and culture. Democratization in Guatemala therefore requires a radical redistribution of wealth and power toward what has been termed "the 87 percent majority" (Jonas 1991).

What type of policy recommendations flow from this analysis? We could say that, if it is interested in bringing about democratization and development, the transnational elite "should" promote a far-reaching agrarian reform and income redistribution. It should organize mass health and educational campaigns and special programs for women and children; encourage independent nationwide trade unionism and social movements; place local, grassroots leaders in positions of authority throughout the state's institutions, with special emphasis on the indigenous and women; ban impunity and purge from the state and definitively punish all those responsible for human rights violations and misuse of state institutions. But such policies will not come about until or unless they are forced on the Guatemalan state and the transnational elite by the "87 percent majority," or unless the elite is removed from positions with the institutional power to suppress such policies.
Many in the policy and academic community see such policy recommendations as unrealistic. The current global capitalist order has achieved a remarkable ideological hegemony, in that the structural constraints it sets have become accepted and the only alternatives put forward as legitimate and "realistic" are those that respect those constraints. The extent of social change may be fixed by historical structures, but the outer limits of those structures are always established and reestablished by collective human agency (and our intellectual labor as a form of social action).

Capitalist globalization is the macrostructural-historical backdrop to Guatemala and Central America in the twenty-first century, but this process is not predetermined, insofar as structural change is shaped by agents attempting to influence it from below and above. Varying problems of governability and crises of legitimacy characterize country after country in Central America and all of Latin America. The crisis and eventual collapse of the neoliberal project may create the regional or transnational conditions in which to promote alternatives-alternative projects to the neoliberal one, viable forms of struggle from civil society, and state formations-if and when the fortress of the neoliberal state is pried open. The real question regarding democratization and development, therefore, is what are the popular majority's chances to develop effective new strategies and forms of struggle under the dramatically changed national, regional, and global conditions.

The dominant groups in Central America may have reconstituted and consolidated their control over political society, but a new round of popular class mobilization in the mid-1990s pointed to their inability to sustain hegemony in civil society. Subordinate groups demonstrated a renewed protagonism at the grassroots level, outside of state structures and largely independent of organized leftist parties. Indigenous, women's, environmental, neighborhood, peasant, worker, and other social movements have flourished in civil society. The left's failure to articulate a counterhegemonic alternative and to protagonize a process of structural change from political society has helped shift the locus of conflict more fully to civil society.

Given the ability of transnational capital to utilize its structural power to impose its project even over states that are captured by forces adverse to that project, perhaps the real prospects for counterhegemonic social change in the age of globalization is a "long march through civil society" in the Gramscian sense. This march should be part of a movement of globalization from below, to accumulate counterhegemonic forces beyond national and regional borders and to challenge the power of the global elite from within an expanding transnational civil society.' Continued change-in Guatemala, in Central America, and in global society at large-will be shaped by conflict and crisis among the summits of power as the hegemonic groups find it increasingly difficult to maintain governability and assure social reproduction, by recomposition of civil society at the base, and by the interplay of the two at the local and global levels.
Copyright Journal of Interamerican Studies Winter 2000
Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights Reserve

Nicaragua the Stolen Revolution--transcript by J. William Middendorf, II

2008-03-10T12:56:00.000-07:00

US Department State Bulletin, June 1985
The U.S. delegation wishes to note that on July 18, 1984, we last raised the matter of Nicaragua's failure to live up to its solemn promises of july 12, 1979, to the Secretary General of this body. They promised the OAS to hold early free elections, to establish an independent judiciary, and to uphold human rights. The OAS, in turn, for the first and only time in its history, withdrew its support for a sittng member government.

It is my delegation's sad duty to report that, since that date, no progress has been made in the fulfillment of any of these promises. We, therefore, have a continuing responsibility to monitor this situation until these commitments are fulfilled to this body's satisfaction.

When Sandinista troops entered Managua on July 19, 1979, they were met by joyous throngs of Nicaraguan citizens who believed that, at long last, freedom and economic well-being were at hand. We all know now that the Sandinista revolution was stolen--stolen by a small, hardcore group of Marxist-Leninists who did not represent majority opinion within the Sandinista movement but who had long conspired to take the movement over and who were armed to make it possible to carry out their plan.

Impact of Sandinista Rule
Let us look first at the impact almost 6 years of Sandinismo have had on the ordinary Nicaraguan people. We are not talking now about political figures or business leaders but about the nicaraguan "man in the street"--the ordinary Nicaraguan whose only ambition is to make a descent enough living to support his family. What is happening to this ordinary Nicaraguan today?

* His children don't have enough to eat. Robert Leiken, who initially strongly supported the revolution, wrote in the New Republic on October 8, 1984, that children were supposed to be the "spoiled ones" of the revolution. Instead, he noticed on his visit last year far more naked children with signs of malnutrition than he had ever seen before in Nicaragua. most foodstuffs are rationed, with the local Committees for the Defense of Sandinismo handing out ration cards--or witholding them for citizens who show "insufficient revolutionary fervor."

* His older children, from age 11 on up, face the possibility of being drafted into the Sandinista Armed Forces. Strong-arm recruiters snatch them off the streets or from their schoolrooms to fill the ranks of the Sandinista military, which now outnumbers all of the other military forces of Central America combined.

* His freedom of speech is sorely limited. The Committees for the Defense of Sandinismo keep their eye on him. If he complains to a neighbor about something the government has done, he may find himself hauled before a neighborhood court, with no appeal of any sentence that court hands down allowed.

* his freedom to be informed about national and international events is restricted. Radio an television news are under government control, and they broadcast only what the Sandinista party wants them to. There is only one opposition newspaper, La Prensa, and it is so heavily censored by government censors that it frequently suspends publication because after the censors are through there is not enough news left to print. And sometimes the government orders it to suspend publication anyway.

* His livelihood is threatened. If he works in the private sector, the gradual elimination of private enterprise by the Sandinista government may leave him without a job. If he is a farmer, under the laws establishing state agencies--which are the only entities to which he is allowed to sell his produce, at a non-negotiable price fixed by the government--he may not even hold back seed for next season's planting. He may not receive enough income to make ends meet.

* The average nicaraguan has always been religious. He has usually been a devout Catholic or, in the case of the Miskito Indians, a devout Moravian. Now, he finds his church leaders, including the Pope, harassed by Sandinista youth mobs, the "Turbas Divinas." He finds his priest or pastor accused of being "a counterrevolutionary" when he refuses to praise the Sandinista government in his sermons. He can no longer hear the Archbishop's homily on radio or television because the Sandinistas do not allow it to be broadcast without their prior censorship, something to which the Archbishop has understandably refused to submit.

Compare his situation with that of ordinary citizens in neighboring Costa Rica and Honduras, and you will see the contrast. While those countries have problems, they are working democracies where people can say what they please, don't have to worry about their children being drafted, and where farmers can sell their produce in the market themselves or choose among several competing middlemen who will buy the produce for resale.

Yet the Sandinista leaders say that countries such as Honduras and Costa Rica must undergo their own revolutions. Interior Minister Tomas Borge, in his interview in Playboy magazine of September 1983, was asked to respond to the Reagan Administration contention that, following its triumph in Nicaragua, the revolution will be exported to El Salvador, then Guatemala, then Honduras, then Mexico. Borge replied: "That is one historical prophecy of Ronald Reagan's that is absolutely true."

On the second anniversary of the Sandinista revolution, Borge gave a speech in Managua in which he said: "This revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always internationalist...."

In our special session on February 29, 1984, my esteemed colleague from Nicaragua told this body:
If we had wanted to attack Costa Rica with a specific end in mind, we would have done so, and they wouldn't even had enough time to ask that a special session be called, because by then they would have been occupied....
While supposedly denying an intention of invading Costa Rica, this statement shows how confident the Sandinistas are in their ability to invade their southern neighbor successfully, if they ever feel the desire to do so.

Broken Promises
I think it is worth asking, taking into account these statements I have just mentioned as well as many others, what makes anyone believe that the Sandinista government is willing to live in peace with its neighbors? Just because they have stated their peaceful intentions?

You will recall that promises made to this body on July 12, 1979, have not been kept. how, then, can we assume that promises not to attack their neighbors will be kept by the Sandinistas? When almost daily we observe shots fired by the Sandinistas across the honduran and Costa Rican borders, and guerrillas trained by the Sandinistas carry on their activities in El Salvador and Guatemala, and Managua has been the command center for the guerrilla activities throughout Central America--can we believe their avowal of peaceful intentions?

Let us review the record again. In 1979 the Sandinista junta promised the OAS that it would respect human rights, set up an independent judiciary, and hold "the first free elections in this country."

Human Rights. As I have already pointed out, human rights have been violated on a massive scale. The mistreatment of the Miskito and other Indian tribes was especially noteworthy. Shortly after the revolution, the Miskito Indians' traditional homelands were flooded with Cuban and Nicaraguan personnel who said they were there to "rescue" them. The attempt was made to force them to give up their traditional way of life and adopt the Marxism-Leninism of the revolution. As Freedom House said at the time, the program "is to deprive them of their socio-cultural identity." Their traditional, freely elected leaders were replaced with Sandinista-appointed authorities--some of them Cubans.

Massive relocation of the Miskitos, as well as other tribes such as the Sumo and the Rama, was undertaken. In some instances where they resisted, Miskitos were killed. Men, women, and children were forced to walk long distances on foot. Their farm animals were often appropriated by the state. Ominously, we hear reports today of similar involuntary forced relocation of people from a wide area in rural northern Nicaragua and of Sandinista army personnel putting the torch to the fields left behind. So much for the promise to the OAS to respect human rights.

Independent Judiciary. In 1979 the Sandinista junta promised this body that an independet judiciary would be established. Yet justice has become the servant of Sandinista totalitarianism. The neighborhood courts, where people are judged for such "crimes" as failing to attend Sandinista party rallies, hand down sentences which are not subject to judicial review. The nominally independent Supreme Court of Jusitce has limited power to review decisions handed down by lower courts. The right of habeas corpus has been practically eliminated.

The recent Urbina Lara case illustrates the lack of respect Sandinista justice has for the traditional Latin American doctrine of asylum. Mr. Urbina Lara, who had taken refuge in the Costa Rican Embassy, was forcibly removed from the Embassy building, wounded, and imprisoned by Sandinista authorities at a moment when the Costa Rican diplomats had briefly left the Embassy building unoccupied except for Mr. Urbina Lara. Mr. Urbina Lara was allowed to leave Nicaragua only after the incident threatened to disrupt the Contadora peace process. We understand that President Ortega has told high-level vistors to Managua that Urbina Lara left the Embassy of his own accord. On his arrival in Colombia, however, Mr. Urbina Lara confirmed the details of this breach of the principle of diplomatc asylum. Meanwhile, his defese lawyer was detained for several days in Managua jail without charges. So much for the Sandinista promise to the OAS of justice.

Free Elections. Finally, in 1979 the Sandinista junta promised early, free elections. Late last year, "elections" were held. But they were nothing but a sham, as the Sandinista government refused to create the conditions whereby the largest opposition coalition, the Coordinadora Democratica Nicaraguense, could have any chance to compete. That group's candidate, Arturo Cruz, who had, at one time, been the Sandinista government's own ambassador to Washington, had his rallies disrupted by Sandinista youth mobs--the so-called Turbas Divinas--on repeated occasions during reelectoral period. His pronouncements were censored from the opposition newspaper, La Prensa, and were not carried by the government print and broadcast media. Indeed, Sandinista censors have assured that criticism of the government is all but absent from the media.

Faced with the situation in which the Sandinista government would not allow Curz to conduct a full and free campaign, after many attempts to negotiate campaign guarantees, the coordinadora refused to participate in the election campaign.

Two other parties intended to pull out also. In one case, mobs broke up a meeting of the Partido Conservador Democrata at which a vote to pull out of the elections was about to be taken, with a clear majority in favor. In the other case, Partido Liberal Independiente candidate Virgilio Godoy announced on October 21 that he was withdrawing his candidacy, but the government press continued to run his campaign advertisements, and La Prensa was censored when it attempted to report the withdrawal.
No matter how honest the vote counting itself, an election is nothing more than a sham if parties who wish to run are not given the chance to mount a full and fair campaign.

I think it would be interesting to see what Sandinista leaders themselves hav e said about elections. In May 1984 Comandante Bayardo Arce, one of the nine members of the Sandinista Directorate gave a speech to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party. He did not realize that the speech was being tape-recorded. A text of it appeared in the Barcelona newspaper, La Vanguardia, on July 31, 1984, and I note that the Sandinista goverment has never denied the authenticity of the text. Comandate Arce said, "...of course, it we did not have the war situation imposed on us by the United States, the electoral problem would be totally out of place in terms of its usefulness..."

If we analyze this statement, we are led to believe that if the freedom fighters have not waged their valiant fight to force the Sandinistas to live up to their promises, the junta never would have held elections.
Comandate Arce also said:
...We think the electoral process...was and continues being an offensive tool from the standpoint of confronting U.S. policy.... It is well to be able to call elections and take away from American policy one of its justifications for aggression against Nicaragua...bourgeous democracy has an element which we can manage and even derive advantages from for the construction of socialism in Nicaragua...we are using an instrument claimed by the ourgeoisie, which disarms the international bourgeoisie, in order to move ahead to matters that are for us strategic...we believe that the elections should be used in order to vote for Sandinismo, which is being challened and stigmatized by imperialism, in order to demonstarte that, in any event, the Nicaraguan people are for that totalitarianism, the Nicaraguan people are for Marxism-Leninism...we see the elections as one more weapon of the revolution...

There you have the affirmation, in Comandante Arce's own words, that the elections were held not because of the Sandinistas' love for democracy but for purely tactical reasons. Is it any wonder, then, that they established conditions under which only the Sandinista party had any chance of victory? Had they given the coordinadora democratica a fair chance to campaign on an equal footing, the Sandinistas would have been in danger of being swept out of office--something they could not risk. Thus, on November 4, 1984, the election which was held had to be the sham that it was. So much for the Sandinista promises the OAS Secretary General in 1979.

U.S. Initiatives
In this connection I would like to note that Congressman Claude Pepper, who honors us with his presence today, has written my country's President, Ronald Reagan, to call attention to the recommendation of the U.S. Congress, embodied in Public Law 98-215 of December 9, 1983. This recommendation proposes that the President seek the prompt reconvening of the 17th meeting of consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of evaluating the compliance of the Sandinista government with respect to the promises tothe OAS and also to consider whether that goverment is living up to the terms of the OAS Charter.

I would also note that I have received the text of House Resolution 81 of March 7, 1985, sponsored by 56 members of the U.S. Congress, which calls on the President to grant explicit recognition to the democratic Nicaraguan resistance and urges the President and all members of the OAS to support the Nicaraguan resistance--the so-called contras--in their quest for peace, human rights, free elections, and national reconciliation. Yesterda, Senator Durenberger spoke to the National Press Club about the Nicaraguan situation.

My government's efforts to get the Sandinistas to live up to their promises has often been branded by them as a lonely effort by President Reagan which does not have the support of the American people or their elected representatives in the Congress. I would submit that the existence of these congressional initiatives by conressmen from both the Democratic and Republican Parties shows the deep concern of the American people about the danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere posed by the actions of the Sandinista dictatorship.

The Search for a Solution
I would also like to take note of the recent document on national dialogue of the Nicaraguan resistance, proclaimed in San Jose, Costa Rica, on March 2, 1985, by the coordinadora democratica, which has named as its representatives Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo, and Adolfo Calero.

In it, they request that the Sandinista government engage in a national dialogue leading to democratization of Nicaragua--a political system which guarantees real separation of power, development, and reconstruction; reconigtion of civilian primacy over the state; full respect for human rights; demilitarization of the society; a foreign policy which emphasizes a good relations with neighboring states; an economic system which gives importance to the development of the private sector; institution of a multiparty system which guarantees alternation in power and respct for minorities; freedom to organize labor unions; agrarian reform; municipal autonomy; respect for the culture and traditions of the Atlantic coast; a general political amnesty; and expulsion from the country of advisers from Cuba and other communist countries.

In this connection, the coordinadora is noat asking that Dniel Ortega be ousted as president, but only that he live up to the 1979 promises the OAS. It is a pity that the Sandinista goverment did not take advantage of this opportunity to resolve Nicaragua's problems by peaceful means.

Up to now, the Sandinistas have refused calls for dialogue with the opposition. Yet, in el Salvado and Colombia we have recently seen the occurrence of dialogue with the armed opposition, so why should Nicaragua be a special case where dialogue is inadmissible?

We are told constantly by the Sandinistas that the armed resistance in Nicaragua is nothing more than a movement of forer Somocistas who are battling to return to power. This lie has been repeated so often that even some of my own country's pres seems to have accepted it as true.

I note also that the Contadora group will meet next month in the hopes of establishing a final solution to the Central America problem. It is my hope that this process will finally resolve the crisis not only in Nicaragua but in all of Central America. I would like to say at this point, however, that any agreement is only so many pieces of paper until it is put inot practice. Once again, foolproof measures of verification must be included in any such agreement if it is to be effective. I note the words of Lenin, as quoted by C. L. Sulzberger in the New York Times of June 13, 1956. Lenin said: "We must be ready to employ trickery, deceit, law breaking, withholding and concealing truth." The Sandinista leaders have proclaimed many times that they are Marxist-Leninists. Are they in accord with this statement by Lenin?

My government only asks that the Sandinista goverment live up to its solemn commitments to the OAS. I would note that no government provided more aid to the Sandinistas during its first 18 months in power than the United States, which gave $118 million in aid. The Sandinista goverment began its inordinate military buildup immediately upon taking office, when the resistance had not yet formed. Texts used in literacy programs and elementary education from the beginning of the revolution used perjorative terms against my country. Radio Sandino from the beginning of the revolution, attacked my country in the most vicious terms. On 15 different occasions over a period of 4 years, President Ortega falsely and irresponsibly accused my government of organizing an imminent invasion of his country, a tactic similar to that used by Castro 20 years ago in Cuba to consolidate power. The record shows that militarism and hostility to the United States were hallmarks of this Cuban-Soviet style revolution from the very beginning.

It is my hope that peace will return to Nicaragua through one or another of the processes that I have mentioned here; but it no process is successful, I would remind this body of its responsibilities. In the final instance, the Organization of American Stats has a responsibility to assure peace in Nicaragua, since in 1979 it took the unprecedented step of withdrawing support from a sitting member government in Nicaragua and replacing it with the Sandinista junta. My government does not intend to allow this organization to ignore its responsibilities in this regard and reserves the right at some future date to introduce a resolution leading toward the satisfactory resolution of the Nicaraguan problem, if the processes which I have already detailed do not bear fruit.
COPYRIGHT 1985 U.S. Government Printing Office 
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group

El Salvador Social Movements: Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES)

2008-03-09T15:18:00.000-07:00

http://www.cispes.org/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1

This website chronicles up-to-date information of the group, "Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador." It provides information on how individuals can get involved with different social movements, and has a news section in which individuals can read about what the group has accomplished over the past few months. This website is a great resource for individuals who wish to get involved, take action or even donate toward the cause of justice for people in El Salvador.

Guest commentary: How Cambridge helped human rights triumph in El Savador

2008-03-09T15:16:00.000-07:00

Cambridge - Who couldn’t use a human rights success story these days? Well, Cambridge has one in its role in a human rights crisis in El Salvador over the last two months, culminating in a judge on Feb. 19 throwing out a case brought by the Salvadoran government against social movement organizers as “terrorists.” Our story starts with the sister city relationship Cambridge established in 1987 with the village of San José las Flores in El Salvador during the middle of the civil war there. Although the war ended in 1992, a struggle for economic justice and human rights is still essential.

Fast forward to July 2, 2007, and the little town of Suchitoto in the department of Cuscatlán. The government had planned a public ceremony to announce a government project to “decentralize” water in the country, which most people in the social movement in El Salvador interpreted as a step toward privatizing the supply of water, with the possibility that even fewer people would have affordable access to a clean water supply. The Salvadoran social movement planned a forum in Suchitoto on the same day to raise these questions. But the government saw an opportunity to discredit the social movement and make another of several recent, ominous moves to close the democratic space in the country. The day before the government ceremony and the public forum, the security forces, including elements of the Salvadoran military (in violation of the 1992 peace accords), militarized all the roads around the town, and laid plans to trap and arrest the organizers.

On July 2 in the early morning, security forces blocked the road and prevented buses arranged by the forum organizers from picking up people along the road. People standing alongside the road waiting for buses were attacked without warning by police with tear gas and rubber bullets. People fled, but also protested and did their own road-blocking with stones and tree branches. It was a mess. Then when the police had cleared the road and started to let vehicles through, police cars isolated the vehicle carrying two members of one of the organizing groups (CRIPDES), their media person and the driver. The people in the vehicle were forced out of the car, handcuffed, and the driver asked by a conveniently available TV reporter, “Why did you block the road?” These four and nine others were charged as “terrorists” under a November 2006 Special Anti-Terrorism Law in El Salvador, taken before a special tribunal judge, Ana Lucila Fuentes de Paz, and put in jail for a 90-day “preventive detention,” pending potential prison sentences of up to 60 years, if convicted.

At the request of Cambridge Sister City and other U.S. solidarity organizations, Cambridge’s Congressman, Michael Capuano, authored a letter to Salvadoran President Elias Antonio Saca, signed by 41 other members of Congress, raising questions about repression of political expression and raising doubts about the notion the Suchitoto 13 were “terrorists.” The 13 were given conditional freedom July 27, pending a Feb. 8 status hearing before the judge.

U.S. El Salvador Sister Cities formed a 10-member special human rights investigation team, of which I was a member, which went to El Salvador Jan. 19 to 27. With four congressional offices requesting meetings for the human rights team with high officials, the team was able to meet with the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, Dr. Agustín Calderon, the vice minister of Foreign Relations, Eduardo Calix (designated by Saca to meet with us), the Human Rights ombudsman, Oscar Luna, and John Speaks, the Human Rights person at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador. The team also went to Suchitoto for a half-day to have direct interviews with eyewitnesses. The team gave a press conference Friday, Jan. 25. Present were two TV stations, two radio stations and the newspaper Diario Co-Latino. They not only listened intently but very strongly carried our message — as the first item in the TV news that afternoon and the headline in the afternoon Co-Latino newspaper. The message: No way does it make any sense to charge these people as terrorists, and if the government is going to suppress political expression in this way, it could jeopardize $461 million in development funds from the U.S. that are conditioned on respect for human rights and responsiveness to the population. That money threat is what caught the headlines. The archbishop of San Salvador, Monse-or Fernando Sáenz Lacalle, expressed his concern over this possibility in an interview Sunday, Jan. 27, as most of us were flying home.

At the Feb. 8 hearing, the Salvadoran prosecutors came back, not with charges of “terrorism” but of public disorder and aggravated damages of state property. Judge Fuentes de Paz decided that, absent charges of terrorism, her special tribunal was no longer the appropriate venue for the case and remanded it to the district criminal court in Cuscatlán for a Feb. 19 hearing. On that date, the judge, having waited for an hour for the Salvadoran government prosecutors to show up, ruled that the case was to be dismissed in its entirety and all charges dismissed. So the Suchitoto 13 went from the prospect of 60 years in prison to unconditional freedom. This is a major milestone along the way to assuring an open, democratic society in El Salvador, and Cambridge can be proud of its part.

http://www.wickedlocal.com/cambridge/homepage/x1637678389

Suchitoto 13: El Salvador’s “American-made” Terrorism Act in Corporate Play

2008-03-09T15:14:00.000-07:00

Written by Robert Weitzel
by Robert Weitzel and Meredith DeFrancesco

“Because we were struggling against the privatization of water. Now we have to struggle against the anti-terrorism law.”

In 2001 El Salvador replaced the colon with the U.S. dollar as its national currency. In 2006 its right-wing government replaced lawful dissent with U.S. inspired anti-terrorism legislation as its national policy. In return, the Salvadoran people are offering Americans an object lesson in the value of our Bill of Rights when dollar meets dissent.

On the morning of July 2, 2007, an estimated 400 Salvadorans who were waiting for buses to take them to the small town of Suchitoto to attend a public forum on the privatization of water utilities were accused of blocking the road and were attacked by riot police firing rubber bullets and tear gas. Two women and one man were arrested.

In Suchitoto’s central square, word of the attack and arrests spread through the crowds waiting for the motorcade and press caravan of President Antonio Saca, who was coming to Suchitoto to announce his administration’s new “"National Decentralization Policy,” a plan viewed by many Salvadorans as the first step in privatizing the country’s publicly-owned water resources.

In solidarity with the marchers being attacked, people began moving in the direction of the melee. Met by police and military units supported by helicopters and machine guns mounted on jeeps, people in the front ranks, attempting to avoid further violence, raised their hands in the air pleading for calm and shouting, “we are unarmed.” The riot squad responded by advancing on the crowd firing rubber bullets and tear gas at close range. Many Salvadorans were injured by bullets or overcome by gas. Ten people were arrested.

Oscar Luna, the Salvadoran Human Rights Ombudsman, spoke out against the blatant human rights violations committed by the police and military at Suchitoto, stating, “I was able to identify the following human rights violations: excessive use of force, excessive use of weapons, mistreatment, illegal treatment, acts of torture, because that is torture when you threaten to throw someone out of a helicopter. It’s against all kinds of conventions and violations to human integrity….”

A witness to the protest simply said, “The people who were creating terror here were the police.”

The “Suchitoto 13,” as the defendants are known, were initially charged with public disorder, but Attorney General Garrid Safie quickly upped the charges to “terrorism” under the country’s “Decree 108: The Special Law Against Acts of Terrorism” enacted in 2006. Judge Fuentes de Paz ordered the Suchitoto 13 to be held for three month in preventative detention to allow the prosecutor time to gather evidence supporting the charge of terrorism. Released in late July on conditional liberty, the defendants still face the possibility of 60 years in prison if convicted as “terrorists.”

Writing in defense of the Suchitoto 13, Amnesty International said it, “fears that those concerned were arrested to punish them for their involvement in legitimate acts of protest and to prevent similar acts in the future.” They went on to say, “Any charges that impair the lawful exercise of fundamental rights should be dropped . . ..”

The fate of the Suchitoto 13 should be of particular interest to Americans who value the right to lawful dissent and free speech. El Salvador’s Decree 108 was not only modeled on the USA PATRIOT Act, but the vagueness and ambiguity of its language rivals that used in the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in December 2007 by a 404-6 vote and which is currently being considered in the Senate. The language in both countries’ anti-terrorism legislation has been crafted so that constitutionally protected dissent can, with a corporate nod, be prosecuted as acts of terrorism and result in draconian sentences.

El Salvador’s right-wing government has close ties to the Bush administration. It was with the urging and support from his friends in the Oval Office that President Saca was able to implement CAFTA (Central America Free Trade Agreement) in March 2006. Critics of CAFTA say it was no coincidence that the anti-terrorism legislation was enacted six months later, an occasion praised by the United States ambassador to El Salvador as proof that the two countries are partners in the war on terrorism. Or, more cynically stated, partners with the multinational corporations whose interests both Decree 108 and the Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act are meant to protect.

Lorena Martinez, one of the Suchitoto 13 and president of CRIPDES, the Association of Rural Communities for the Development of El Salvador, the principal organization coordinating the Suchitoto forum, said that by passing Decree 108 “the government wants to a set a precedence for social movement organizations, especially organizations that have been very visibly protesting against what the government’s been doing . . . CRIPDES and other organizations were very strongly against the free trade agreements, against the interests of multinational companies.”

February 8 was the last day the prosecution had to present its case against the Suchitoto 13. It is not certain whether Attorney General Safie will stay with the charge of terrorism or downgrade the charge to the original public disorder—the definition of which was recently changed and the sentences doubled. The defendants could spend up to eight years in prison if convicted on the lesser charge. Defense lawyers and social movement leaders said that whether the charge is terrorism or public disorder, this case is about the criminalization of social protest.

Whatever the defendants’ ultimate charge, Decree 108 has accomplished what President Saca and President Bush and their multinational corporate partners intended. It has instilled fear and hesitation in the minds of citizens whose right to free speech and dissent are inalienable rights guaranteed by their respective constitutions. In short, it is terrorizing citizens into silence.

Those of us north of the Rio Grande River, who swear by the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, can take cold comfort in the fact that forty-two Senators sent a letter to President Saca last July regarding the charges brought against the Suchitoto 13. They wrote, “It’s hard to imagine such acts could constitute terrorism.”

Let’s hope these same Senators remember the Suchitoto 13 when it’s their turn to vote on S. 1959: The Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act, which was written, like El Salvador’s Decree 108, to protect the corporate dollar and prosecute lawful dissent.

http://atlanticfreepress.com/content/view/3411/81/

Conflict Grows Between Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador

2008-03-05T03:26:00.000-08:00

*followup to Domingo's last post
-Trinh

Conflict Grows Between Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador
Wednesday, March 05, 2008

CUCUTA, Colombia — Venezuela and Ecuador took their growing conflict with Colombia to the diplomatic front, seeking international condemnation of Colombia's deadly assault on a rebel base in Ecuador.
The two countries tightened their borders and were deploying thousands of troops, while Colombia on Tuesday pointed to documents found in a slain rebel leader's laptop that it called proof of stunning links between the leftist guerrillas and Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez.
Ecuador rejected a Colombian apology for the cross-border strike as insufficient, and sought to rally opposition during an emergency meeting of the Organization of American States, convened in Washington to help defuse one of South America's most volatile crises in years. Venezuela's justice minister declared that war "has already begun."
At Venezuela's border with Colombia, National Guard troops turned back Colombian cargo trucks under orders from Caracas.
Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa began a six-nation tour in Peru and Brazil, calling Colombian President Alvaro Uribe a liar who "wanted war." Correa warned that if the attack goes unpunished, "the region will be in danger, because the next victim could be Peru, it could be Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, any one of our countries."
At the moment, it's mostly a war of words, and other nations have tried to keep it that way, although many said Colombia was wrong to send troops into Ecuador. The military assault on Saturday killed 24 guerrillas, including Colombian rebel spokesman Raul Reyes, who was engaged in hostage talks with Venezuela, France and other countries.
President Bush backed Colombia and accused Chavez of "provocative maneuvers."
Uribe said Chavez should be prosecuted before the International Criminal Court for allegedly financing the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. Uribe said documents found in a laptop seized in Reyes' camp showed Venezuela recently made a US$300 million payment to the rebels.
Venezuela dismissed the allegations as lies and Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro said the idea of prosecuting Chavez was "laughable." Justice Minister Ramon Rodiguez Chacin said the hand of Washington was behind Colombia's actions, declaring: "Our enemy is the empire."
Colombia also accused the rebels of trying to make a radioactive dirty bomb, although the documents it shared with reporters don't support that allegation, indicating instead that the rebels discussed the possibility of buying uranium to resell at a profit.
In Brazil, Correa suggested late Tuesday that the Colombian raid was carried out to prevent the liberation of rebel-held hostages.
He offered no proof, but said he agreed with speculation that Colombia targeted Reyes "to prevent a deal for the liberation of the hostages from going forward."
The FARC freed four hostages last week, and Chavez had pledged to try to win freedom for others including French-Colombian politician Ingrid Betancourt.
The rebels said Tuesday that Reyes died "completing a mission to arrange, through President Chavez, a meeting with (French) President (Nicolas) Sarkozy" aimed at securing Betancourt's release.
In Washington, Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Maria Isabel Salvador said Colombia's apology wasn't enough, demanding that the OAS condemn the incursion, appoint a commission to investigate it and call an urgent meeting of the region's foreign ministers in the next week.
Colombia's attack on the camp 1.8 kilometers (just over a mile) inside Ecuador reflected its frustration over the ability of rebels to take refuge across poorly patrolled borders.
Uribe said he would not allow his nation to be drawn into war.
Venezuela was sending about 9,000 soldiers — 10 battalions — to the border region as a "preventive" measure, retired Gen. Alberto Muller Rojas, a former top Chavez aide, told The Associated Press. Ecuador said it sent 3,200 troops to the border on Monday.
Venezuela's agriculture minister, Elias Jaua, said Venezuela had closed the border — which sees annual trade worth roughly US$5 billion — to imports and exports.
Leonardo Mendez, a spokesman for a Colombian cargo transport association, said some 300 vehicles, including trucks carrying food, shoes, ceramics and other products, were stuck at one major border crossing.
Despite the shrill rhetoric from the Andean governments, in several border towns there was little sign of tension apart from the turning away of trucks by Venezuelan border guards.
Contenting themselves by calling Chavez "crazy", Colombian truckers lounged in the shade drinking beer and saying they hope the crisis won't persist long.
When the border is open, each day some 8,500 metric tons (9,400 tons) of merchandise cross between Colombia and Venezuela in both directions, said Jaime Sorzano, head of the cargo transport association. "In the past, we've had episodes, problems, but like this crisis no. It's unprecedented," he said.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,335073,00.html

Colombia to file lawsuit against Chavez in ICC

2008-03-04T11:33:00.000-08:00

Colombia to file lawsuit against Chávez in International Criminal Court

Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Tuesday said his country is filing with the International Criminal Court a lawsuit against his Venezuelan counterpart Hugo Chávez, "for sponsorship and funding of genocidal" people.
"Our Ambassador to the United Nations is making the announcement that Colombia plans to file with the International Criminal Law a lawsuit against Hugo Chávez, President of Venezuela, for sponsorship and funding of genocidal" groups, Uribe told reporters, AFP reported.
The Colombian government Monday said it found a letter suggesting that Chávez was involved in the delivery of USD 300 million to the rebel Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC).
According to Bogota, the document was found in a document confiscated in the rebel camp in Ecuador where the second man in the guerrilla group, commander Raúl Reyes, was killed during a Colombian Army attack.

Source:http://english.eluniversal.com/2008/03/04/en_colcd_art_colombia-to-file-law_04A1406361.shtml

Posted by Domingo.

What would you say people in the US think about Venezuela? ...get a clue!

2008-03-03T16:40:00.000-08:00

Angus Reid Global Monitor : Polls & Research
Venezuela, Brazil Most Influential for Americans
February 11, 2008

Abstract: (Angus Reid Global Monitor) - Many people in the United States think Venezuela and Brazil are the most prominent nations in Latin America, according to a poll by Zogby Interactive. 29 per cent of respondents say Venezuela is the most influential country in the region, while 23 per cent select Brazil.

(Angus Reid Global Monitor) - Many people in the United States think Venezuela and Brazil are the most prominent nations in Latin America, according to a poll by Zogby Interactive. 29 per cent of respondents say Venezuela is the most influential country in the region, while 23 per cent select Brazil.
Mexico is third on the list with 18 per cent, followed by Cuba and Argentina with three per cent each, Colombia with two per cent, and Chile with one per cent.
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez—a left-leaning leader—has been in office since February 1999. In July 2000, he was elected to a six-year term with 59.5 per cent of all cast ballots. In August 2004, Chávez won a referendum on his tenure with 59 per cent of the vote. The special election was called after opposition organizations in Venezuela gathered 2.5 million signatures to force a recall ballot. In December 2006, Chávez earned a new six-year term with 62.89 per cent of the vote.
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva—a member of the Worker’s Party (PT)—won the October 2002 presidential election in Brazil with 61 per cent of the vote in a run-off against Jose Serra of the Brazilian Party of Social Democracy (PSDB). In October 2006, he earned a new four-year term, defeating PSDB candidate Geraldo Alckmin with 60.8 per cent of the vote in the second round. Lula is ineligible for a third consecutive term in office.
Chávez has become a major player in Colombia’s struggle with the left-wing rebel army Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Last year, Colombian president Álvaro Uribe invited Chávez to act as a mediator in order to free hostages held by the FARC. More than 700 hundred people are currently being held in captivity by the left-wing armed group. Almost 50 of them are politicians, police and army officers that the FARC intends to use for the purposes of negotiating the release of its incarcerated members.
Chávez’s mediation ended abruptly in December, when Uribe accused him of breaching the rules of their agreement. Chávez—who claims to be able to communicate with FARC commanders—vowed to maintain his "commitment" to free the hostages. The incident has significantly strained relations between the two nations.
On Jan. 10, former Colombian vice-presidential candidate Clara Rojas was freed by the FARC in Venezuela, along with former legislator Consuelo González de Perdomo. The FARC defined their liberation as "retribution" to Chávez for his mediation efforts.
On Jan. 30, Colombian Liberal Party (PLC) senator Piedad Córdoba—an ally of Chávez who has also worked as mediator between the government and the FARC to free hostages—said that the Venezuelan president is "the only person" who can succeed in bringing freedom to the hostages, but assured that Chávez "doesn’t have authority over the FARC."
Polling Data
In your opinion, which Latin American country holds the most influence in the region?
Venezuela 29%
Brazil 23%
Mexico 18%
Cuba 3%
Argentina 3%
Colombia 2%
Chile 1%
Panama *
Nicaragua*
Peru*
Costa Rica*
(*) Less than one per cent.
Source: Zogby Interactive Methodology: Online interviews with 7,106 American adults, conducted from Jan. 18 to Jan. 21, 2008. Margin of error is 1.2 per cent.

Source:http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/venezuela_brazil_most_influential_for_americans/

Posted by Domingo.

Chavez's point of view about International Law and Violence

2008-03-03T16:22:00.000-08:00

Hi all;
Last week we also discussed a little bit about violence and peaceful means for social transformation and their relationship with International Law....this is -to certain extent- what Chavez thinks about that. DBG.-
------------------------------------------------

Chavez criticizes Israel and Colombia for claiming, “right to defense” to justify invasions
March 3rd 2008, by YVKE Mundial

March 2, 2008,(YKVE Mundial) - Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez criticized the ambiguity of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ba Ki-Moon, for his comments expressed in reference to the conflict in the Gaza Strip. Ki-Moon classified the attacks against Palestine, which left 90 dead in four days as "excessive use of force" but classified the launching of homemade rockets from Palestine towards Israel, that left one person dead during the same four days, as "terrorism."
"Well, what cynicism!" Chavez said this Sunday in his program Hello President, in Caracas. "And this is coming from the Secretary General of the United Nations. What hope do we have!"
"The legitimate right to defense" as a justification to invade countries
The President criticized Israel as well as Colombia, who he said hide behind "a supposed right to defense" to bomb neighboring territories, neighboring peoples, neighboring countries. "This is what Israel does."Chavez pointed to the words of General Secretary Ba Ki-Moon about "recognizing the right of Israel to defend itself," and compared these words to a communiqué emitted by the Colombian government [over its incursion into Ecuador]: "Colombia did not violate sovereignty, rather it acted on the principle of legitimate defense." "This is the same as what Israel says." Chavez said. "Israel and Colombia say this because this is the order of Washington. What is more serious is when the Secretary General of the United Nations says he ‘recognizes the right of Israel to defend itself' but only condemns as ‘disproportionate and excessive use of force' that which has killed and injured so many civilians including children."
"Isn't this terrorism, Mr Ki-Moon?" Chavez continued. "You see how cynicism prevails in the world! The bombings in Iraq, that destroy entire towns is not classified as terrorism. But the FARC are supposedly terrorists!"
This is the same in the case of Colombia Chavez argued. "What the Colombian government does is bomb whole areas where peasants live, houses, small farms, they destroy all of these with their inclement bombing - ah, this is not terrorism, but the FARC are terrorists! This is the cynicism of imperialism replicated by its lackeys!"Venezuelan Armed Forces on alert!
In the face of this, Chavez asked the Venezuelan Armed Forces to be alert "We must be alert, Minister (of Defense Rangel Briceño). Meet with the Commander of the Strategic Operational Command and begin moving troops, to strengthen our border region with Colombia. Imperialism should not even think about using their lackeys of the Colombian oligarchy to attack Venezuela! If they do we will have to respond forcefully.The President gave a clear warning to Uribe: "I suggest you don't even think about it, President Uribe." Later he added: "We are not going to allow a violation of our territory. The sovereignty of our land is sacred." He indicated that he would confront any war with resolution and without ambiguity, but emphasized his high regard and fondness for the Colombian people.
Translated by Kiraz Janicke
Source:
YVKE Mundial

Source: http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/newsbrief/3220

Posted by Domingo.

More... on the FARC documents disclosed by Colombia.

2008-03-03T16:11:00.000-08:00

Memorandum found in Raúl Reyes' computer

Letter on the critical issues with Ecuador addressed to the members of the FARC Secretariat
Secre13
February 28, 2008To the Comrades of the Secretariat, Our Best Regards.
1. The phase of unilateral release of prisoners has been completed successfully. We have taken several burdens off our shoulders and we have propped up our political stance before the eyes of Chávez. The downside is the increasing pressure regarding Ingrid (Betancourt), given Luis Eladio Pérez's statements that she is in a bad health condition and subject to discriminatory treatment. As far as I know, this woman has a volcanic temper. She is offensive and defiant to the guerrilla troops who are in charge of taking care of her. Besides, since she is a literate in image and semiology, she uses her knowledge to provoke reactions against the FARC. As I expect the French Envoy to complain about this, I intend to inform him about this situation.
2. A summary of the meeting with President Correa's Envoy follows:a) He asked for a personal meeting in Quito with the Secretariat. He offered assurances and transportation from the border to the meeting place.b) He expects us to send back a reply as soon as possible, including the meeting date.c) He asked whether we would like to make this with military support of with support of his minister of state security.d) He wants to talk to the FARC about the humanitarian agreement, the border policies, the political solution, Ingrid, and Chávez's role. He wants to establish communications with us over the bilateral border.e) He wants to explain the purposes of Plan Ecuador, through which he intends to offset the harmful effects of Plan Colombia and which is to be implemented over the border.f) For the purposes of Plan Ecuador, they are asking us for courses on mass organization for people living in the border, which the government would later designate to coordinate work in the border. The advantage in this is the fact that these people are part of the Clandestine Army or in the Bilateral Committee oriented by Front 18. g) He insisted he is interesting in cooperating with the swap of prisoners, for which he is calling for the release of Moncayo's son or any other prisoner.3. Regarding their invitation, we thanked for it and explained to them that such decisions have to be made by the Secretariat, and that this requires some time. We made it clear that we are interested in making a contribution to the goal of coming closer in the border, which is consistent with the policies we exposed in the Bolivarian platform, the manifesto and other documents issued by the Secretariat.4. Based on the talks with the Envoy, Chávez-Correa relations are not at the best moment. Besides, Uribe is regularly calling Correa to help him to iron out differences with Chávez. Besides his Ambassador, Uribe has another official based in Quito, whose mission is lobbying with Correa and his government, seeking help to fight against the FARC and to improve relations with Chávez. 5. We are concerned about the likely mobilization to attend this invitation, given the significant number of intelligence agencies and high levels of corruption in this country, where the government is quite weak.6. The gringos called for a meeting with the minister to ask him to tell us they are interested in talking about several topics. They claim they new president in their country will be Obama and that these people are interested in their fellow citizens. Obama will support neither Plan Colombia nor the signature of the Free Trade Agreement. In this regard, we replied we are interested in relations with the governments that are on equal grounds and that in the case of the United States, a public statement voicing their interest in talking to the FARC is needed, given their eternal war against us.That is all. Regards, Raúl.

Source: http://english.eluniversal.com/2008/03/03/en_int_art_memorandum-found-in_03A1403679.shtml

Posted by Domingo.

Part of the documents disclosed by Colombia, linking supposedly the FARC with the Governments of Ecuador and Venezuela.

2008-03-03T16:05:00.000-08:00

Memo from Raúl Reyes to FARC Secretariat

This is one of the documents the Colombian government said were found in a jungle camp in Ecuador where top FARC commander Raúl Reyes was killed. According to Colombian Police Commander Oscar Naranjo, the documents show evidence that the president of Ecuador, President Correa, has relations with the FARC
Secre03January 1, 2008
To the Comrades of the Secretariat, our brotherly regards.
1. I do believe the time has come to launch Comrade JE's proposal to request the government of Venezuela to receive the prisoners who are in the two parties' hands, until the contenders initial a swap agreement. With this proposal, (Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez) is to win greater prominence, and we are going to suffocate the unviable pressures for us to agree to visits to the ill prisoners that stemmed from the media campaign that emerged following publication of the proofs of life. Apart from strengthening the audacious Chávez's move to recognize the belligerent status of both the (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces) FARC and the (National Liberation Army) ELN, which caused so much phobia and bewilderment in (Colombian President Álvaro) Uribe, we would be encouraging Chávez himself and (Nicaraguan President Daniel) Ortega and other amicable governments, which are likely to join the recognition of belligerence later.
2. We met with the Security Minister of Ecuador Gustavo Larrea (hereinafter Juan) who, on behalf of (Ecuadorian) President (Rafael) Correa, expressed his respects for Comrade Manuel (Marulanda) and the Secretariat, and exposed the following:
1. The President's interest in making the relations with the FARC leadership official, through Juan.2. Willingness to coordinate social assistance activities benefiting the people living in the border, exchange of information and control of the paramilitary crimes in his territory.3. Willingness to remove law enforcement officials who are hostile to the communities and civilians in the area, for which they are asking us to provide information.4. They ratified their political determination to refuse to take part in Colombia's internal conflict by supporting Uribe's government.For them, the FARC are a people's insurgent organization with social and political proposal they understand.5. They asked whether we are politically interested in the recognition of the belligerent status, and share Chávez's proposal in this direction.6. They are to file a lawsuit against the Colombian government and state with the International (Crime) Court for the harmful effects of the spraying (on drug crops) under Plan Colombia.7. Next year they are to terminate the gringo license over Manta air base. 8. They have plans to tighten trade and political ties with Asia, particularly China, Vietnam and North Korea.9. Their government plan aims at laying socialist foundations, for which they are attaching special importance to the National Constituent Assembly.10. They are offering help to support the FARC's efforts to achieve a humanitarian swap and political solutions. They understand that Uribe represents the interests of the White House, the multinationals, the oligarchies. They believe he poses a danger for the region. 11. They are asking our leader and the secretariat to make a contribution that boosts their efforts to achieve the swap, for example delivering to President Correa the son of professor Moncayo or something invigorating his political role.12. They would provide documentation and protection to one of our members for him to engage in a work of building relations, which in his view should be conducted discretely, given the risks of capture or killing by Uribe's agents.13. We have set channels for communication and suggested the possibility to meet again in one or two months to review these matters and to go deeper into these issues.This is what we discussed in our talk to Juan.We explained our border policies, our interest in having political relations with his government, the importance of the recognition of belligerence, our commitment to the swap and the political solutions to the Colombian crisis. We thanked for his offers and support to the mission conducted by Chávez. Regarding his petition, we told him the Secretariat would send back a reply later

Source: http://english.eluniversal.com/2008/03/03/en_int_art_memo-from-raul-reyes_03A1403519.shtml

Posted by Domingo.

Colombia discloses documents linking Chávez to the FARC

2008-03-03T15:51:00.000-08:00

Hi there;
Since we briefly mentioned some of the Colombian guerrilla movements -e.g.; FARC- in our class last week, I'm now posting one of the most recent events envolving not only them but also the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela:
---------------------------------------------------

Colombia discloses documents linking Chávez to the FARC

Colombia Monday unveiled documents seized from guerrilla leader Raúl Reyes, who was killed last Saturday by the Colombian Army, which show an alliance, old contacts and even financial aid between the rebel Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.
The documents were disclosed by General Oscar Naranjo, head of the Colombian National Police, in the Colombian government palace during a news conference.
The records include a letter from Luis Devia, alias Raúl Reyes, found in his computer. The letter stresses Chávez's gratefulness for some USD 50,000 the FARC gave him when he was in jail in 1992, after his failed coup d'etat, AP reported
According to Naranjo, the documents included a letter dated last February from commander Luciano Marín, alias Iván Márquez, a member of FARC Secretariat, to other colleagues. In the letter, Márquez talks about "Venezuela's financing to the FARC at USD 300 million."

Source: http://english.eluniversal.com/2008/03/03/en_int_art_colombia-discloses-d_03A1403879.shtml

Posted by Domingo.

Sources of information on Venezuela

2008-03-03T15:41:00.000-08:00

Hi everyone;
Through this link you will find a lot of information about Venezuela, including local and international newspapers, TV networks, blogs, think tanks, etc, from both official and non-official perspectives (which includes the opposition side), in English and Spanish. I think it's the most complete link that you may find on the web about the country:

http://www.venezuelatoday.net/

Cheers!
Domingo.-

Chavez sends tanks to Colombia border

2008-03-02T11:46:00.000-08:00

Thought this was kinda important to our class...

Side bar: note the beautiful descriptive words "saul" uses.

- Andrea G

Chavez sends tanks to Colombia border in dispute

By Saul Hudson 12 minutes ago

CARACAS (Reuters) - Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez moved tanks to the Colombian border and mobilized fighter jets on Sunday, warning Bogota could spark a war after its troops struck inside another of its neighbors, Ecuador.

Reacting to Colombia's killing on Saturday of a Colombian rebel inside Ecuador, a Venezuelan ally, Chavez also ordered the withdrawal of all his diplomats from Bogota in the worst dispute between the neighbors since he came to office in 1999.

"Mr. Defense Minister, move me 10 battalions to the frontier with Colombia immediately, tank battalions," Chavez said on his weekly TV show.

"The air force should mobilize. We do not want war. But we are not going to let them ... come and divide and weaken us."

Colombia's military said on Saturday troops killed Raul Reyes, a leader of Marxist FARC rebels, during an attack on a jungle camp in Ecuador in a severe blow to Latin America's oldest guerrilla insurgency. The operation included air strikes and fighting with rebels across the frontier.

Chavez, who had warned a similar operation in Venezuela would be "cause for war," said on Sunday he would send Russian-made fighter jets into U.S. ally Colombia if its troops struck inside his OPEC country.

Colombia denied it failed to respect Ecuador's sovereignty and said Saturday's operation was a response to fire from across the border.

"Colombia has not violated any sovereignty, only acted in accordance with the principal of legitimate defense," the government said in a statement.

"The terrorists, among them Raul Reyes, were used to killing in Colombia and invading the neighboring countries to hide. Many times Colombia has suffered these situations, which we are obliged to avoid to defend our citizens," it said.

Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has often jousted with neighbors over spillover from its four-decade conflict but has managed differences with pragmatism. Now the dispute among the conservative Colombian and his leftist counterparts has gone from aggressive words to action.

Uribe has complained before that FARC guerrillas take refuge in frontier areas, though neighbors say his troops are not doing enough to prevent violent spillover from the conflict.

The leftist anti-U.S. Chavez has been in a diplomatic dispute with his ideological opposite, Uribe, for months because of the Venezuelan's mediation with FARC rebels over their hostages. Uribe has accused Chavez of using the mediation to meddle in Colombian affairs.

On Sunday, Chavez accused Uribe of lying over the details of the operation that killed the rebel in Ecuador, where the leftist government of President Rafael Correa is a close Venezuelan ally. He called it a "cowardly assassination" of a "good revolutionary."

"I am putting Venezuela on alert and we will support Ecuador in any situation," Chavez said

ECUADOR WITHDRAWS AMBASSADOR

Ecuador has withdrawn its ambassador to Colombia in protest and also questioned if Uribe lied when he initially explained to his southern neighbor that the strike was in response to fire from rebels across the border against Colombian troops.

"He (Uribe) is a criminal. Not only is he a liar, a Mafia boss, a paramilitary who leads a narco-government, and leads a government that is a lackey of the United States ... he leads a band of criminals from his palace," Chavez said.

Colombia's government had no immediate reaction to Chavez' troop movements and comments on Sunday, although Uribe has in the past called for prudence in diplomatic disputes.

Chavez, a Cuba ally, sees himself as a leader of Latin America's left and says right-wing Uribe is an obstacle to uniting South America.

Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue thinktank in Washington and a critic of Chavez, said the Venezuelan was playing with fire even if the spat could distract from his domestic problems such as chronic shortages of some foods.

"There is a risk here as he reacts strongly and often overreacts, but this could backfire on him," Shifter said. "This is not going to achieve what he wants in terms of regional politics ... It maybe is a measure of how concerned he is about his own domestic support."

"I don't know how far he is going to go with this but it is a risky political action," he added.

(Additional reporting by Patricia Rondon in Caracas and Patrick Markey in Bogota; Editing by Cynthia Osterman)

Rebel Women in the Zapatista Movement

2008-02-26T23:28:00.000-08:00

Hey everyone!

Here is a link to a news article published about recent meetings by Zapatista women. They congregated to tell their stories as female activists-- and to organize against the exclusion of women (especially lesbians) from political decision-making in the EZLN-- while men were ordered to stay at home and tend to the families and farms.

http://www.latinamericapress.org/article.asp?lanCode=1&artCode=5507

Here also is an image I found from google.images. Not necessarily from the particular meeting mentioned in the article, but just to give you a visual.

Abrazos,
Jenna

KPFA segment on our class topic!

2008-02-26T16:54:00.000-08:00

http://www.againstthegrain.org/

go to the against the grain website. in case you didn't listen in today, it was a great prep for our class tomorrow.

adam

Great Mexico NPR pieces

2008-02-26T11:27:00.000-08:00

Mexico Focuses on Police Who Aid Drug Trade- Feb. 11th 2008 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18873251

Mexican President to Meet with Schwarzenegger- Feb. 13th 2008 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18937750

Where the Candidates Stand on Illegal Immigration- Feb. 1st 2008 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18615528

Border Battles, Immigration Issues and You- Jan. 14th 2008 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18071533

Most of these are pretty short, say, a few minutes, and they're all (as all NPR pieces are) interesting and informative. I recommend listening to them while cooking dinner, driving, or something like that.

Enjoy!

paz
Madison

Social movements in Mexico

2008-02-26T00:27:00.000-08:00

Angie Rodriguez

PACS135

Hi all!

I'm posting a link to a news story about the social mobilization that is currently taking place in Mexico to resist the right's attempts to implement neoliberal reforms and privatize PEMEX, the state-owned oil company.

http://www.ueinternational.org/Mexico_info/mlna_articles.php?id=129#798

For all of you who speak Spanish, check out the website of La Jornada (Mexico's progressive newspaper) at www.jornada.unam.mx/ for updated information about the Zapatistas, the civic resistance movement against Calderon's illegitimate government, and more.

And because sometimes an image says more than a 1000 words, I'm also posting some pictures of the resistance movement that followed the fraudulent 2006 Mexican elections. Some of the pictures are mine, and some have been collected via the internet.

Peace,

Over one million people protesting at "Zocalo" Mexico City's main square

People calling Fox " traitor to democracy", 2006.

Protesting Calderon's militarization of the country

"Espurio" means illegitimate

"Traitors to democracy"

"The Revolution of the 21st century will rise up in Oaxaca", message painted on a wall in Oaxaca, 2006.

"I voted and I won't shut up" slogan at a concert organized at UNAM campus in 2006

The new struggle "No to the privatization of PEMEX"

Peruvian farmers protest free trade!

2008-02-20T23:37:00.000-08:00

http://www.elnuevod ia.com/diario/ noticia/portada/ noticias/ arranca_manana_ la_huelga_ magisterial/ 366268

BACKGROUND:With the US maintaining subsidies on its genetically modified,industrially produced, pesticide treated treated field crops and factoryfarmed meat, dairy, and egg products, Peruvian family farmers will bedriven out of business by the US-Peru Free Trade Agreement, ratified byCongress in late 2007. This will lead to forced migration of farmers,destruction of ecologically sustainable traditional methods ofagriculture, increased profits for inhumane factory farms, more farmersgrowing coca for the global cocaine trade, and rural displacement andunemployment creating a new workforce for sweatshop and corporateplantation exploitation. Peru's farmers are being murdered in the streetsas they protest this destructive policy!

Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton BOTH supported the Peru FTA! (and McCain supports EVERY FTA!)--------

Peru Declares State of Emergency on Farm ProtestsFeb. 19 (Bloomberg) -- Peru's government declared a state of emergency after a farmers' protest left at least four dead and more than 700 under arrest.Farmers called the nationwide protest to push for state subsidies as part of a free-trade agreement with the U.S., for lower prices for fertilizers andfor a halt to farm seizures by banks. Peru, the world's largest exporter of organic coffee, asparagus and paprika, boosted agricultural exports to theU.S. and China by 10 percent to $2 billion last year."The agreements we've reached don't establish amounts or deadlines,'' saidEnrique Malaga, president of the National Irrigation Board, which is organizing the protest. "The government has lost all credibility. ''Protesters in the southern Andes blocked the railway line to the Incacitadel of Macchu Pichu, Peru's biggest tourist attraction, yesterday,forcing the suspension of the service, Orient Express Hotels Inc. unitPeru Rail said in an e-mailed statement.<<http://www.bloomber g.com/apps/ news?pid= 20601086&sid=ajtlepQBdSAg&refer=lati>http://www.bloomber g.com/apps/ news?pid= 20601086&sid=ajtlepQBdSAg&refer=latin_america><http://www.bloomber g.com/apps/ news?pid= 20601086&sid=ajtlepQBdSAg&refer=latin>http://www.bloomber g.com/apps/ news?pid= 20601086&sid=ajtlepQBdSAg&refer=latin_america

Farmers strike turns violent in Peru; four dead

Posted : Wed, 20 Feb 2008 04:54:00 GMTLima - The second day of nationwide protests by farmers in Peru spiralled into violence with two protestors shot by police and another falling to his death trying to elude tear gas shells. Transport was paralyzed in the departments of Ayacucho, Arequipa, Cusco and several other parts of the country because of the strike that began Monday, when police said one farmer was shot by an angry motorist.The unions called the strike to pressure the government . . . . (on)measures to alleviate the impact of a new trade agreement with the UnitedStates.

Amazing Cuba Film

2008-02-20T22:05:00.000-08:00

The Power of Community: How Cuba Survived Peak Oil (2006)

This is a film about some central issues from our discussion on Cuba and the agricultural revolution. It is very well done and informative, as well as extremely inspiring!
I unfortunately don't know (haven't looked into) where you can get it, but I at least want to make it known to everyone so that you can seek it out (I was lucky enough to be shown it by a friend). Let us know if you find it/buy it.

Thanks!
paz
Madison
madisonsheffield@gmail.com

Aracelia_ week 5

2008-02-20T11:30:00.000-08:00

Aracelia Alvarez
PACS 135
Reading Response week 5
Cuba!
The case of Cuba, is indeed, a remarkable example to the rest of the industrialized nations that with basic technology it is possible to create a socially just and sustainable future. Cuba defies U.S. approaches to food production, distribution, and consumption.

What exactly is the foco strategy?

On page 105 Raby writes that… “down to the present it (the Cuban Communist Party) continues to express Cuban internationalism in a radically different context”. I was unclear as to what this means.

The case of Cuba is important to study, but from the beginning M-26-7 was able to take advantage of an anti-imperialist sentiment in the rural areas. Today, urbanization is the norm- we have been far removed from the land for a long time, so that changes the conditions drastically.

What is the role of CDR’s? And what makes Cubans believe that they are spies? How is dissidence or anti-revolutionary ideology handled? How is the opposition dealt with?

How do the Cuban popular masses feel about Cuba today? What is their perspective on
capitalism and the U.S? In the U.S. we hear the opinions of those who have fled and are part of the opposition, but not enough from the common people who have improved quality of life?

Did Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro have a relationship prior to Chavez winning the presidency in
Venezuela?
VIVA FIDEL! VIVA LA REVOLUCION! VIVA CUBA!

Fidel resigns as president of Cuba!

2008-02-19T10:23:00.001-08:00

What a coincidence, as this is our week on Cuba!

Fidel announced his resignation last night, saying he was "not in a physical condition" to continue as president and commander-in-chief but promised to remain a "soldier of ideas". What does this mean for the future of socialist Cuba? Will Raul (Fidel's brother) or another revolutionary continue Cuba down the same path? Or will the US take the opportunity to intervene in their affairs? What's interesting is that no demonstrations calling for change were reported in Havana, in contrast to celebrations by anti-Castro exiles in Miami. Sounds like the Cuban people are pleased with their leadership... shouldn't the US respect the Cubans' right to self-determination? Check out the link below to read a BBC article about the US's position on Fidel's resignation, as well as the role of the EU and China.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7253491.stm

BY ALLISON STINSON

Candidates and Imperialism

2008-02-16T16:45:00.000-08:00

I came across this article in the Huffington Post the other day and I thought it was an interesting tie in to our discussion about the presidential candidates on Wednesday. -Shan Shiels

by Sam Sedaei
Unapologetic Imperialism
2/11/08

During a campaign stop last month, someone in the audience rose to ask John McCain about Iraq. The questioner began to share some background facts before posing the question, saying "President Bush has talked about our staying in Iraq for fifty years." Before he got the chance to ask the question, McCain interrupted him by saying, "make that a hundred!" "Is that..." the questioner gets cut off again; "We've been in South Korea ... we've been in Japan for 60 years," McCain said. "We've been in South Korea 50 years or so. That would be fine with me. As long as Americans are not being injured or harmed or wounded or killed."

During his farewell speech at CPAC, Mitt Romney made a similar remark about America's military ventures abroad. He made the point that because the United States has never taken land during its occupations, they should not only be condemned, but celebrated as the sign that we're "the greatest country on earth." The ironic part of the statement was not the fact that it was factually inaccurate as throughout the past century, the United States has taken land for its 700 military bases abroad that stretch from Australia and Saudi Arabia to Eastern Africa and South America. Neither is the most ironic part of the statement the fact that Romney was quoting Shimon Peres's remarks about America, who coincidentally was at the time of the statement the leader of a country that itself has maintained a 4-decade long military occupation and home demolitions in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, all with the help of one-fifth of the United States' entire foreign aid and vetoes of just about every UN Security Council resolutions every year. But making that very statement was rooted in Romney's complete misunderstanding of how America's military ventures are viewed abroad.

John McCain has served this country for two decades and was a prisoner of war for five years in Vietnam. And although the value of his service in the Vietnam War that should have never been waged is not determined, his willingness to serve has been extraordinary. But his statement about permanent occupation represents a complete lack of understanding of the differences between occupations that have been different in numerous aspects such as the time of occupation, reasons for occupation, country of occupation, international support for the occupation and the impact of occupation on America's standing in the world.

Senator McCain's reasoning is very similar to those of most other conservatives. They believe that "Terrorism" is an extreme interpretation of Islam and committed by people who are inherently "evil" and whose sole purpose is to cause America harm, because we're "the greatest country" on earth. "They hate us for our freedoms," we're told. And because they are evil, American military action and occupation in the name of annihilating the evil would have the support of the people around the world and cause no anger by indigenous populations. They attribute all of the violence in Iraq to Al Qaeda, which nicely fits into these conservatives' narrative. Based on this analysis, McCain would argue that America's staying infinitely in the heart of Arabia would cause no anger or resentment and can lead to the consequent pacification and ultimate neutralization of and domination over the people of Iraq.

It's a nice narrative, except that it's not true. The conservative narrative has been written not to express the realities of the challenges we face. It is rather designed at the predetermined aim of meeting the following criteria: a) to exclude any act of terrorism committed by the United States and any of its closest allies; b) paint all terrorists in history as Muslims; c) take any elements of rationality out of anything that can be identified as a "cause" for terrorism, and hence, avoid having to address America's responsibility in provoking violence; and e) provide the United States with an implied moral authority and the justification to take preemptive action against anyone it considers "terrorists" without defining what constitutes "terrorism."

But reality is far from this narrative. For one, the notion that terrorists of any kind hate the United States for our freedoms is ridiculous. I lived in Iran for seventeen years, for ten years of which I went to public schools where the teachers are forced to teach every single anti-American piece of propaganda ever produced. Never have I heard a single teacher make the case that America's freedom is a reason for resentment.

As for John McCain's remarks, there are several aspects of it that are based on plainly wrong assumptions. For one, the occupations in South Korea and Europe during World War II were a part of a coalition effort. It was the consequence of a conclusion and agreement by the members of this coalition that they were fighting a common enemy: fascism. That consensus and America's military actions during the war as an "empire by invitation" made the occupations more acceptable by the occupied people. The occupation in Iraq, however, was done without any such consensus or deliberate effort to understand and reach agreement on the nature of the threat. Instead, America embarked on a unilateral mission to invade a sovereign country before the international body and U.N. inspectors finished their job after dismissing old allies as "old Europe" and withdrawing The United States from Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty, Antiballistic Missile Treaty and the International Court on War Criminals.

Following the invasion, there may have been a short time when the people of Iraq may have thought that America actually had good intentions. But as time passed and Americans refused to leave Iraq even after the capture and execution of Saddam, the indigenous people began to have a very different view point about the occupation. It began to look like the Americans were no longer there for the sake of the Iraqi people; after all, it's really hard to see an occupation force as liberators when the occupiers close off the streets in your own city and tell you not to go into a certain region because the Americans are there and your very presence poses a threat to them. McCain implies that there will be a day when the U.S. forces can have a presence in Iraq and not face hostilities. Such a scenario is impossible when sixty percent of the Iraqis - not Al Qaeda or "terrorists," but Iraqi citizens - now say that it is okay to shoot Americans.

There is something utterly ignorant about McCain's understanding of how American actions are seen throughout the world. Although I don't support Ron Paul, his presence in this election has been of great value in the sense that he has repeatedly asked questions throughout various debates that have led us to put ourselves in the shoes of those countries we occupy. How would you feel if a foreign country were to invade the United States in the name of liberating us, build military bases in Florida and California and declare New York City "green zone" where no Americans are allowed unless they go through multiple foreign-operated check points? Many people have strong religious convictions in the Middle East and find America's military presence in the holy land as a dagger in their hearts. It was America's presence in Saudi Arabia - and not our freedoms - that played a major role in motivating the highjackers to give their lives in attacks against "the infidels" on September 11, 2001.

Throughout this campaign, various candidates have gotten away with defining themselves as they have wished with little challenge to their claims. When Hillary Clintons claims experience while having served in public office shorter than all the other candidates who ran on the democratic side, the media would rather go along and define her as the "candidate of experience" instead of challenging her claim. When Mitt Romney claims economy as his strong suit, the media passively accepts that self-definition instead of challenging him for essentially supporting the same kind of supply-side economics that has cost America thousands of jobs and led to the current economic downturn that we face today. So when John McCain claims foreign policy experience, it is not surprising that the media is once again failing to question the merits of that claim even when he makes the kind of a remark that is rooted in his utter lack of understanding of the forces that have caused America's standing to take such a vertical dive over the past seven years and led to unlikely alliances against the United States among hostile powers.
John McCain may believe that America's presence in Iraq will eventually lead to over 1.8 billion Muslims around the world to roll over and accept Christian presence on holy land. But in reality, as long as America does not chart a course that would lead to self-government in Iraq and withdrawal of all American forces not just from Iraq but also from Saudi Arabia and other sensitive regions from around the world, Americans will remain a target for attacks at home and abroad and used by terrorist organizations to recruit disillusioned Muslims to join in violence against the American forces abroad or citizens here in the United States.

U.S. backs Exxon in Venezuela assets battle

2008-02-13T23:57:00.000-08:00

Just to go off of what we were talking about today... I put in bold some of the topics that we were talking about. Cheers.

U.S. backs Exxon in Venezuela assets battle

Wed Feb 13, 2008 8:51pm EST

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States on Wednesday backed Exxon Mobil Corp's effort to win compensation from Venezuela for seized assets in a case that has prompted the OPEC nation to threaten to cut off oil supplies to America.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a foe of the United States, says Exxon court victories that resulted in $12 billion in Venezuelan assets being frozen over the seizure is part of an "economic war" to unseat him directed by the Bush administration.

Despite its support for Exxon, the United States denies it is working to oust Chavez and has distanced itself from the specific legal case.

"We fully support the efforts of Exxon Mobil to get a just and fair compensation package for their assets according to the standards of international law," said State Department spokesman Sean McCormack.

"But we are not involved in that dispute. It is something that has to be litigated between Venezuela and Exxon Mobil and various courts around the world," he added.

Chavez stopped oil exports to Exxon on Tuesday, escalating Venezuela's multibillion-dollar fight with the U.S. company over his nationalization of a project last year that was part-owned by Exxon and Britain's BP.

Separately, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told lawmakers on Capitol Hill that U.S. officials were looking into whether a recently reported deal between Venezuela's state-run oil company and Iran violates U.S. law.

Rice said she was examining issues raised by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen about a reported $1 billion deal late last year between Venezuela's state-run Petroleos de Venezuela SA, which owns the Citgo subsidiary in the United States, and Iran's Petropars, a unit of the National Iranian Oil Company.

Ros-Lehtinen wrote to Rice and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson last week asking they probe whether Citgo benefited from the company's deal with Iran. She also asked whether the deal violates the "letter or the spirit" of the U.S. Iran Sanctions Act, intended to deter investment in Iran.

"I want to thank you for raising the question. Of course, we're looking into it," Rice told Ros-Lehtinen, a Florida Republican, during an appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. A Citgo spokesman in Houston could not be reached for comment.

A group of 21 Republican legislators, including Ros-Lehtinen, is also looking to pass a resolution that would add Venezuela to a list of countries that support terrorism.

The motion requested an investigation into whether Venezuela could be defined as providing sanctuary for terrorists. Chavez's critics accuse him of allowing Colombia's Marxist guerrillas to cross the porous border into Venezuela.

Chavez, who opposes the war in Iraq, brushed aside the accusations and said the United States should examine its own record.

"The first country that has to be on the list for supporting terrorism is called the United States," he said. "The first on the list of people is George W. Bush."

Britain, where a court issued a temporary ruling in favor of Exxon over Chavez's seizure, also sought to distance itself from the Exxon case on Wednesday to avoid harming ties with the OPEC nation.

"The judiciary is independent. It's important to avoid that this adversely affects the good ties we have with Venezuela," British Ambassador Catherine Royle told reporters after dozens of Venezuelans protested the court ruling outside the embassy in Caracas.

Exxon and fellow American oil company ConocoPhillips quit Venezuela over a wave of nationalizations last year. BP was one of several European companies that struck deals to remain in the seized projects as minority partners.

Corn Ethanol

2008-02-13T14:34:00.000-08:00

If anyone wants to get a better understanding of the environmental and agricultural impacts of corn ethanol, then read the Council on Hemispheric Affairs report.

http://www.coha.org/2007/06/12/maize-of-deception-how-corn-based-ethanol-can-lead-to-starvation-and-environmental-disaster-2/

Reading summary Week 4

2008-02-13T11:26:00.000-08:00

Aracelia Alvarez
PACS 135 Feb 13, 2008
Reading Summary Week 4

Burbach/Tarbell: “Imperial Overstretch” and Subcmte. Marcos “4th WW”

The idea of imperial overstretch is interesting choice of words, although I would argue that it is not a new concept. Marx, Lenin, and others wrote about capitalism reaching its limits by arriving at imperialism. My criticism of “Imperial Overstretch” is that it focused too much on Bush and his presidency. It is not only Bush and his regime that have developed U.S. military prowess. The alliance of capitalists, politicians, CEO’s, corporations, neo-cons, and many Democrats for that matter have been complacent as the imbroglio develops. Though by no means do I defend or promote Bush’s politics, he is not the first to speak of spreading democracy or liberal ideals across the globe. This is a game of hegemony, and Bush is not immune to it. As was proposed by the readings, this is an “empire of deceit” bent on economic control by any means necessary.
The mobilization of popular forces as a “second superpower” is inspiring. But let us not be naïve- the forces we challenge are powerful as well. Hegemony and apathy still reigns supreme. I am hesitant to believe that in the U.S., a majority of the population and many in industrialized nations (the privileged classes)will be willing to sacrifice comforts and commodities for the possibility of ‘another world’. Sorry for the cynicism! The writings of Subcomandante Marcos are inspiring, but he is preaching to the choir. The intergalactic, planetary wars can be as easily contested as Al Gore’s preaching about Global Warming. Marcos suggests that resistance is being woven by those who have been excluded from “modernity” but I would argue that many have been resisting from within modernity too.

Hardt & Negri: Multitude

I need elaboration on the distinction between the postmodern phase and Globalization.
The permanency of war and police and the idea of a zero-tolerance society make perfect sense in connection to biopower. The NYPD and LAPD have both launched zero-tolerance policies, in the name of anti-terrorism. These policies have heightened the ability of police and military to act as state informants, state terrorists, and mercenary forces within U.S. boundaries and abroad. Meanwhile federal policies have diminished so-called civil rights that were designed to provide citizens with fundamental constitutional protections. As Hardt and Negri point out, there is an inherent weakness in considering human rights- humans rely on much more than rights (ie: food, water, air, social relationships, etc). Just as the global and economic interests of empire rely on networks, so do the various forms of resistance- the Zapatista struggle is one example.

Zapatistas lose supporters in Mexico

2008-02-12T20:34:00.000-08:00

(in relation to 'positive' techniques of counterinsurgency strategies)

By MANUEL DE LA CRUZ, Associated Press Writer Thu Feb 7, 1:08 PM ET

POLHO, Mexico - Nearly 200 families have abandoned the Zapatista rebel movement in one of its strongholds, turning to the government for aid at a time when the insurgents are complaining about the loss of outside support.

On Wednesday, each family received initial payments of $43 in a ceremony with Salvador Escobedo, a top official with the federal government's Social Development Department. The government is promising similar payments every two months, as well as a school and medical center.

The ceremony in Polho, long a backbone of the Zapatista movement, appeared to be the most prominent desertion from the insurgency since 2004, when about 400 families in the unofficial rebel capital of La Realidad broke away to accept government help, dividing the village in two.

The rebels have forbidden any aid from state or federal officials that they regard as illegitimate. Instead, they have created a series of self-declared autonomous communities such as Polho with their own schools, clinics and aid networks.

Community leader Javier Luna said the families decided to abandon the insurgents because they needed a government school, access to better medical care and other essentials.

They apparently will continue to live in the village of several thousand people, where rebels and non-rebels will go to different schools and clinics — a pattern in several other towns.

The Zapatista rebels staged an armed uprising in 1994 in the southern state of Chiapas, and built an international following. After initially battling the Zapatistas, the government turned to offers of negotiations and aid, which have gradually eroded rebel support in many communities.

In December, Zapatista leader Subcomandante Marcos said he was withdrawing to the shadows, ending nearly two years of public appearances aimed at bolstering a grass-roots leftist movement across Mexico.

In making the announcement, he complained that the once widespread national and international support for the Zapatistas has been "insignificant or null" recently.

wiki characteristics of late capitalism

2008-02-12T20:20:00.000-08:00

Among the characteristics of late capitalism (or the 'third age' of capitalism after freely-competitive capitalism and monopoly capitalism) are said to be:

the hypertrophy of the state, and systematic attempts by the state to moderate economic fluctuations as well as exerting more and more social controls;

intensified monopolistic and oligopolistic competition for superprofit in world markets;

the co-optation and integration of trade union and oppositional political movements into the state apparatuses;

the globalisation of financial capital, commercial capital and production capital;

a third technological revolution (electronics, synthetics, computerisation, biotechnology) and accelerated technological innovation;

accelerated turnover of capital and the pressure to engage in comprehensive economic planning of investments;

An increase in the rate of surplus value attributable mainly to increased productivity of labour;

a permanent arms economy in which the military industry becomes a significant factor in economic growth;

permanent currency inflation and growing debt levels;

the hyper-concentration and centralisation of capital ownership and management on a world scale, in giant industrial and banking corporations;

neo-colonialism involving unequal exchange and humanitarian imperialism where armed intervention in foreign countries is morally justified by reference to humane concerns;

the corrosion and breakdown of all traditional social institutions by market forces, leading globally to a succession of continual wars, armed conflicts and unarmed social conflicts;

(according to Leo Kofler) an optimistic belief in the power of technology to solve all problems, or, alternatively, a cultural pessimism. Some writers like Andre Glucksmann extrapolate this pessimism as a nihilist ideology; others like Elmar Altvater and Tariq Ali have interpreted it as a retreat to fundamentalism; and yet others like Frank Furedi see the pessimism as a cult of human vulnerabilities diminishing human potential and sowing unwarranted anxieties;

an ever-increasing gap between the rich and the poor, within and between countries, as strong market actors defeat the weaker ones;

the growth of "excess capital" (overcapitalisation) and "excess capacity", meaning that much additional capital is no longer invested in expanding production, but diverted to trade and capital accumulation based on already existing physical and financial assets - with obvious effects on employment opportunities.

US Imperial Overstretch

2008-02-11T21:45:00.000-08:00

Venezuela president threatens US with oil embargo
Caracas, Feb 11 : President Hugo Chavez has warned he will cut off Venezuela's oil flow to the US if the latter launches an economic war against his country via firms like Exxon Mobil.
Chavez delivered the warning on his weekly radio and television show "Alo Presidente" Sunday after Exxon Mobil Corp won court rulings to freeze $12 billion worth assets of state-run oil firm Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), EFE news agency reported Monday."If you freeze our assets and cause us harm, we will cause you harm. Take note of that Mr Bush, Mr Danger," the Venezuelan leader said referring to US President George W. Bush.In June 2007, Chavez had forced all foreign oil companies to transfer about 60 percent of their business in Venezuela to PDVSA. Many companies like TotalFinaElf of France, Statoil of Norway, BP of Britain and Chevron of the US accepted the new conditions, but Exxon Mobil and the third-largest US oil firm, Conoco Phillips, sought international arbitrage and withdrew from the country.Houston-based Exxon Mobil Friday said it had won court orders in Britain and the Netherlands to freeze up to $12 billion in PDVSA assets. Reacting to the US firm's announcement, Chavez said if an economic war was unleashed against Venezuela "the price of oil will touch $200 per barrel.""And more than one country is ready to go along with us in that economic war. You're not going to frighten us and you're not going to dissuade us," he said.Chavez went on to say that Exxon Mobil was one of the firms that were on the "spear point of imperialism" and he included it among the "imperialist bandits, white collar thieves, corruptors and topplers of governments".Venezuelan Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez said the freeze would not affect PDVSA's operating capability.Venezuela supplies about eight percent of US's total annual oil consumption and it is believed an oil embargo will lead to an adverse impact on the world's largest economy.Relations between the two countries have long been strained with Chavez accusing Washington of being behind the failed coup attempt against him in 2002. The Venezuelan leaders also called Bush "the devil" at the UN General Assembly

Scholar: US sought help in Bolivia (to keep tabs on Venezuelan and Cuban workers in Bolivia)

2008-02-08T18:51:00.000-08:00

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080209/ap_on_re_la_am_ca/bolivia_us;_ylt=AgKgu7Pp6fvNdLc0iOCzv79vaA8F

LA PAZ, Bolivia - An American scholar said Friday that an official at the U.S. Embassy asked him to keep tabs on Venezuelan and Cuban workers in Bolivia. Washington said that any such request would be an error and against U.S. policy.

"I was shocked," Fulbright scholar Alex van Schaick told The Associated Press. "I mean, th man's asking me to spy for the U.S. government." Van Schaick is one of six Fulbright scholars doing research in the country.

The U.S. Embassy in La Paz issued a statement Friday saying that "some routine information sessions about security given to certain American citizens included incorrect information. As soon as this was brought to our attention, appropriate measures were taken to assure that these errors would not be repeated."

U.S. State Department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos said in Washington that any such request would have been a mistake.

"Worldwide, we adhere to a strict understanding with the Peace Corps that their volunteers are not permitted to act in any sort of intelligence capacity," Gallegos said. "If anyone suggested that any members of either group provide information outside the scope of their work or positions, it was an error and is not U.S. government policy."

Also Friday, ABC News reported a claim that the same official made a similar request to a group of Peace Corps volunteers last year.

In a statement, the Peace Corps said that as a matter of law and policy its volunteers cannot be asked to gather intelligence for the U.S. government.

"Any connection between the Peace Corps and the intelligence community would seriously compromise the ability of the Peace Corps to develop and maintain the trust and confidence of the people in the host countries we serve," the agency said.

Van Schaick, 23, said the official made the request during a Nov. 5 security briefing at the embassy.

"He asked me that if I should encounter Venezuelans or Cubans while in the field — doctors, field workers — that I should report to the embassy with their names ... and where they're at, their location," van Schaick said.

Van Schaick said he reported the incident Thursday to Bolivian Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca.

President Evo Morales, a close ally of Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez and Cuba's Fidel Castro, has repeatedly accused the U.S. Embassy of plotting against his government, a charge embassy officials strenuously deny.

Both Venezuela and Cuba maintain a visible presence in Bolivia. More than 1,500 Cuban doctors provide free medical care here in South America's poorest country, while Venezuelan pilots fly Morales around the country in loaned Venezuelan helicopters.

Van Schaick, who arrived in Bolivia last October, said he is using his Fulbright grant to study land use issues among largely indigenous farmers in Bolivia's eastern lowlands.

link to some history

2008-02-08T16:58:00.000-08:00

i found an amazing site with WAY to much information to absorb. there are a world of links to help you understand any historical era you wish to brush up on.

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/modsbook.html

on the left is a green column with different topics. i found the sections with socialism, imperialism, US power and 20C Latin America the most useful.

here are a few of the links that i found the most intriguing! they are very simple and clear summaries and outlines of topics discussed or referred to in class. i promise, all are informative, short and easy to read :)

Guides to types of socialism
http://web.archive.org/web/20001017174300/http://www.dsausa.org/rl/Docs/Lingo.html

Timeline of US intervention is Latin America
http://web.archive.org/web/20001205231700/http://kuhttp.cc.ukans.edu/cwis/organizations/las/interven.html

Intervention in Nicaragua
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/cc101.htm

The crisis of US hegemony in the 21st century
http://lap.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/34/1/5
(this 4 pg article will require you to log in. BUT! you can go to the berkeley library website and use their address as a 'proxy' through your computer so you can access the site for free!)

reading summary 3

2008-02-06T12:37:00.000-08:00

Aracelia Alvarez
01-06-08
Reading Summary Week 2-3

I can see where the combination of the multitude and the 3rd force poses a potential viable force for a democratic society. I appreciate the inclusion of youth, women’s and indigenous social movements in the readings, because they have always been present but not given the credit they deserve.

I am weary about the assumption that a democratic society is what “we” should be striving for. First, I think it is necessary to develop the idea of democracy and what the term or concept really means. Are Indigenous and Non-Indigenous communities striving for this – or this is a western assumption?

The Zapatistas state that they want a new world which includes them, but what would that look like. How would a world or society or community of autonomous collectives look like? Has this been attempted? What are the positive and negative aspects of such a society?

I am in favor of agrarian reform or land redistribution, how can we get this done without violence?

What is the role of the left or the multitude in the U.S? What are we doing to make a new world possible? Has the left been engaged in the idea of the multitude?

Can we elaborate on the Hardt’s idea of “biopolitical production”?

I would like to learn or do a comparative analysis of “Network Struggles” and the use of creativity, communication, and self-organized cooperation as opposed to the democratic centralist principles of past movements.

Is Nationalism a thing of the past? Has it been discarded because it is too narrow?
How has Globalization changed the idea of nationality?

Why has Theology of Liberation become such a force in social movements in Latin America?

Do Indigenous communities recognize Marxism as an applicable theory? I argue that Marxism is a European construction and Indigenous forms of knowledge may be better tools for anti-imperialism struggles.

Note: The Raby book was out of stock in the campus bookstore and at Ned’s so I will read that asap.

Mexican Farmers Protest End of Corn-Import Taxes

2008-02-05T20:45:00.000-08:00

Mexican Farmers Protest End of Corn-Import Taxes

By JAMES C. McKINLEY Jr.
Published: February 1, 2008
MEXICO CITY — Tens of thousands of farmers clogged the streets of the capital on Thursday to protest the end of tariffs on corn from the United States, warning that the elimination of trade barriers could drive them out of business and lead more Mexicans to migrate north.

The farmers brought a herd of cattle and more than 50 tractors to make their point, jamming the historic center and blocking the central artery, Paseo de la Reforma. One rowdy group burned a tractor.

Stretching for more than four miles, the march was a sea of tanned faces, cowboy hats, flags and calloused hands gripping banners with slogans like “Without farms there is no country.” The police said at least 50,000 people joined the protest; organizers put the number at 100,000.

“We cannot compete against this monster, the United States,” said one farmer, Enrique Barrera Pérez, who is 44 and works about five acres in Yucatán. “It’s not worth the trouble to plant. We don’t have the subsidies. We don’t have the machinery.”

One the nation’s largest labor coalitions, the National Union of Workers, joined dozens of farmers’ organizations like the National Campesino Confederation to finance the march. The organizers bused people in from as far away as Chihuahua in the north and Yucatán on the Gulf Coast.

On Jan. 1, the last tariffs on corn, beans, sugar and milk were lifted under the North American Free Trade Agreement, completing a 14-year transition to an open market between Mexico, the United States and Canada.

Since then, Mexican leaders of farm coalitions and other unionists have been calling for the government to renegotiate the treaty, putting them at odds with President Felipe Calderón, a staunch free-trade advocate.

The farmers worry that a surge of inexpensive corn could doom millions of peasants who farm plots of less than 12 acres. They also complain that the government has done almost nothing to prepare farmers for the open competition.

Much of the $1.4 billion in annual aid for farmers, they say, has gone to large agricultural businesses in the northern states rather than to small farms.

“We are mostly angry with the Mexican government,” said Victor Suárez, the leader of ANEC, a farmers’ coalition. “They have left the small producers to fend for themselves.”

Opposition politicians have also seized on corn— along with an unpopular proposal to allow foreign investment in the state oil monopoly — to whip up sentiment against the administration.

Mr. Calderón has fought back. In a speech on Jan. 7, he declared that the free-trade agreement had brought Mexicans lower prices for goods while increasing exports fourfold, even when oil is excluded.

“As with all agreements of this nature, the treaty presents challenges and opportunities, but in general it has been beneficial to Mexicans,” he said.

Yet the renewed debate seems to have touched a nerve in Mexico, where corn was first domesticated 5,000 years ago and the culture revolves around its consumption. Underlying the political discourse is a widespread sentiment that poor Mexicans have benefited little from free-trade policies, while giant businesses have reaped profits.

In practice, however, nothing changed on Jan. 1. Mexico had been gradually dropping its tariffs on corn since 1994, when they stood at more than 200 percent, and most of the corn imports in recent years had entered without tariffs under import quotas. What is more, the corn from the United States is yellow corn, used to feed livestock, rather than the white corn Mexican farmers produce for tortillas.

Some opponents of the treaty, however, say a spike in demand for American corn to produce ethanol has protected Mexico’s farmers so far. Over the long haul, these critics say, small farmers in Mexico cannot face off with the Americans’ heavily subsidized and mechanized farms.

“How are you going to compete with the enormous subsidized farms in the United States and Canada?” said Francisco Hernández Juárez, the president of the National Union of Workers. “It’s totally unequal.”

Agricultural officials here agree that the peasant farmers cannot hope to stay in the game. They say four-fifths of the nation’s 2.6 million small farms have plots so little that they produce only enough to live on and never market their goods.

“Our small producers are not affected by the free trade agreement,” said Marco Sifuentes, a spokesman for the agriculture department. “They don’t participate in the market.”

Francisco López Tostado, an assistant secretary of agriculture, said the answer lay in peasant farmers’ forming large competitive agricultural cooperatives, a policy the administration has pursued.

Several marchers who farm less than five acres said they no longer planted corn or beans except to feed their own families. Even with corn prices high, they said, the high costs of fuel and fertilizer had made it unprofitable to market their corn.

Others with larger farms said they could still make a living, but they feared that imports from the United States would eventually drive the prices down to a point where they could not compete.

Francisco Javier Ríos, 66, a farmer from Bahia de Banderas, in Nayarit State, said he planted 15 acres with white corn each year. Depending on prices and weather, he can make between $3,000 and $4,000 of profit. He worries, however, that imports from the United States will cut his thin profit margin.

“The free market should exist, but it should be more level,” he said. “To compete against them is unfair to us because we don’t get the same subsidies. Our costs are 100 percent ours.”

News Stories on Social Movements in the Americas

2008-01-29T16:28:00.000-08:00

ALAI, the Latin American Information Agency publishes weekly news stories, many of which deal with the perspectives and struggles of the social movements and might be of interest to the class. Most of the articles are written in Spanish, but a number of the more important ones are in English, such as those below.

- Ecuador: Communities affected by mining lobby Ecuador’s National Assembly (Jennifer Moore) [2008-01-21]
http://alainet.org/active/21731

- America Sur: Declaration of La Paz (CAOI) [2008-01-23]
http://alainet.org/active/21772

- Chile: Mapuche Hunger Striker Force-Fed by Chilean Authorities
(Mapuche International Link) [2008-01-23] http://alainet.org/active/21773

- Jubilee South/Americas joins in the Global Day of Action (Jubilee South/Américas) [2008-01-23]
http://alainet.org/active/21805

- Call for full and public review of the Cariforum-EC Economic Partnership Agreement [2008-01-21]
http://alainet.org/active/21744

- The Sense of Humor and Celebration (Leonardo Boff) [2008-01-21] http://alainet.org/active/21771

- EE.UU: Truth about Illegal Immigration and Crime [2008-01-24]
http://alainet.org/active/21822

Chile hunger strike puts focus on Indians' plight

2008-01-28T19:06:00.000-08:00

Jailed activist Patricia Troncoso has had no solid food for 100-plus days, and is seeking release of Mapuche prisoners and return of ancestral lands.

By Patrick J. McDonnell, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
January 28, 2008

CHILLAN, CHILE -- The case of a jailed indigenous-rights activist who has been on a hunger strike for more than 100 days has galvanized support for restive Mapuche Indians seeking the release of prisoners and recovery of ancestral lands in central Chile.

Mapuche activists and their allies have converged on this town in the Andean foothills, where Patricia Troncoso is being held in a hospital. Authorities intervened against the prisoner's will last week and provided Troncoso with intravenous nutrition to prevent her from dying.

Her plight has drawn renewed attention to charges that Chile's much-lauded economic growth has not lifted the Indian minority, which is largely landless, disenfranchised and the victim of police repression. Supporters have staged demonstrations in the capital, Santiago, about 230 miles north, and other cities and have circulated petitions.

"Don't lose hope," Troncoso, 38, urged in a letter read on Thursday, the 107th day of her hunger strike.

Troncoso is calling for authorities to release her and imprisoned Mapuche activists, whom she calls "political prisoners." She also wants the withdrawal of a heavy police presence from traditional Mapuche zones in Chile.

The Mapuche militants are incarcerated mostly for arson strikes against land and trucks belonging to forestry and agribusiness interests. Mapuche leaders say much of the territory was stolen and should be returned to them. Troncoso has served about half of a 10-year sentence for setting fire to a forestry plot -- a charge she denies.

Sympathizers have called on the center-left government of President Michelle Bachelet, who was a political prisoner under the Pinochet dictatorship, to help resolve the hunger-strike impasse. Deputy Interior Minister Felipe Harboe expressed sympathy for the Mapuches, while condemning violence.

"I defend the Mapuche community," Harboe told reporters in Santiago. "But there is a minority that perpetrates acts of violence and stigmatizes the entire community."

The dispute has raised tensions in the region and resulted in periodic confrontations.

On Jan. 3, police shot and killed a Mapuche activist, Matias Catrileo, 22, an agronomy student, as he and others allegedly trespassed on a farming estate.

Three days later, authorities said, shots were fired at a car carrying a hydroelectric executive in Santiago. No one was injured, but officials suspect the shooting may be linked to Mapuche objections to hydroelectric projects.

Human rights groups have assailed the prosecution of Troncoso and others under anti-terrorism laws dating to the former dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.

"What these activists have done may represent crimes under the penal code, but certainly could not be characterized as acts of terrorism," said Jose Miguel Vivanco, who heads the Americas division of Human Rights Watch.

In her statement last week, Troncoso declared, "Pinochet for us has not ended," and cited police checkpoints and other alleged acts of repression. "We keep experiencing him in the country roads, in the house searches, in the persecution, jailing, torture and death."

The case has resonated here and elsewhere in Latin America, where indigenous issues have taken on a higher profile, especially since the election in 2005 of Evo Morales as Bolivia's first Indian president.

But Chile has a much smaller indigenous population than neighbors Bolivia and Peru.

Mapuche Indians in Chile number 600,000, about 4% of the country's population of more than 15 million, according to census figures.

Studies have shown many Mapuches feel discriminated against in a nation long dominated by lighter-skinned Chileans of mixed-race and European origins.

Troncoso, known as La Chepa, is not a Mapuche and was raised in a middle-class family in Santiago. She gravitated to the Indian cause while studying theology at university, said her father, Roberto Troncoso.

"La Chepa is Mapuche in her heart," said Juan Pichun, a Mapuche leader who is among the many holding vigil outside her hospital.

Supporters have set up tents at the hospital gates and strung up cardboard signs denouncing Chilean officials as "murderers." Sympathizers include many students, left-wing activists and environmental advocates who cite a legacy of ecological ruin on former Mapuche lands.

Last week , doctors acted to prevent Troncoso from developing potentially fatal kidney damage, said Dr. Gaston Rodriguez, the police physician who is overseeing her care. Her vital signs have improved since she began receiving an intravenous mixture of vitamins and other nutrients, he said.

Troncoso had to be restrained with straps, Rodriguez said. The restraining procedure resulted in bruises on parts of her body, her friends said.

"Her body is full of marks," said Valentina Peralta, a friend who visited Troncoso in the hospital. She described the prisoner as "physically depleted" but lucid, tranquil and determined to continue to refuse solid foods.

Troncoso has lost more than 50 pounds as her only intake has been liquids such as water, juice and mate tea, sometimes with sugar. Doctors say Troncoso has survived in part because when she launched her fast Oct. 10, she was in robust physical shape, weighing about 185 pounds.

"My daughter has promised me she will live," said Roberto Troncoso.

"I want her to come home alive, not in a coffin."

US Militarization of Latin America

2008-01-24T18:23:00.000-08:00

Aviation Week & Space Technology
January 21, 2008 Pg. 34.
By Amy Butler, Washington

Down South

Regional cost-sharing seems an option for Central American Air Forces aging systems

As planning begins to remove U.S. forces from a key air base in Ecuador, the Pentagon is examining new arrangements with countries farther north, in Central America.

Cooperation with regional militaries and the largely underprivileged
indigenous populations in Central and South America is critical to avoid a
“a repeat’ so the extremism now rampant in Iraq and Afghanistan, says
USAF Lt. Gen. Norman Seip, commander of U.S. Air Forces in Central and
South America. As he works to gain support in Washington for the Regional Aircraft Modernization Program (RAMP), an initiative to pool resources from the U.S. and four Central American countries to modernize their small air forces, he is also beginning to examine how to handle the
counter-narcotics mission in the region without access to Manta Air Base
in Ecuador.

That country’s president has told the Pentagon he does not
plan to allow further use of the base beyond November 2009. The Defense
Department’s withdrawal from Howard AFB, Panama, in 1999 was part of the agreement struck by the U.S. to cede control of the Panama Canal. Manta became the main operating site for the Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, and the U.S. government invested heavily in improving the runway and facilities there after signing a 10-year lease. The Boeing 707-based aircraft use their 360-deg. radars to monitor air traffic, including drug smugglers. Navy E-2s with similar capabilities are also deployed in the region for this mission. A base in South America is
desirable to reduce the time to reach orbit locations for monitoring.
Basing the systems in the Southern U.S. would decrease a monitoring
aircraftâ€™s on-station time. Seip says his staff has only begun to
examine alternate basing locations and their impact on tracking suspect
drug activities. However, the bulk of the Pentagon’s intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance fleet is dedicated to supporting
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. So, the likely outcome of this
basing shift will be a reduced intelligence collection from the assets
that are available.

Forces in U.S. Southern Command got a taste of the support that could come
from unmanned aerial vehicles with a one-time congressionally mandated
demonstration of the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk’s capabilities there.
Seip notes that the long-dwell attributes of UAVs are well-suited to the
counter-narcotics mission. But so far, none have been assigned to him for
that purpose. Meanwhile, Seip is promoting a plan for the U.S. to help
the governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua fund an aircraft modernization program. The age of the A-37s, UH-1s and F-5s used by these nations prohibits life-extension efforts.

The goal is for U.S. forces to introduce aircraft into the fleet, help the
nations train and develop operational plans for the systems and,
possibly, reduce the need for U.S. assets to conduct operations there.
The recapitalization is itemized in three phases. The first is an
inexpensive small airlifter such as the M-28 Sky Truck capable of various missions including short-takeoff-and-landing, intelligence collecting, personnel
recovery and law enforcement. Seip recommends at least four per country
at a cost of $56 million; the ideal objective would be six per nation.
Phase two calls for a medium-lift Huey replacement, such as the Bell 212,
at a cost of $96 million for the purchase of four per nation. An
additional four are being sought.

Phase three would provide an interceptor; Seip favors the AT-6B Texan II.
Four per nation would come to about $128 million, with an additional four
being recommended. Cost-sharing details are to be determined; these
nations would not be able to afford the systems on their own. Seip said it is realistic to anticipate the U.S. would pick up at least 90% of the cost. He hopes to have memoranda of agreement drawn up by June.

The plan also calls for long-term cost-sharing among the Central American
nations for training and logistics and the establishment of a regional
maintenance hub. These measures would produce whatever economies of scale are possible with the purchase of the systems.

Important Class Information

2008-01-23T18:08:00.000-08:00

Class information from the syllabus

Instructors

Roger Burbach

Center for the Study of the Americas, Berkeley

Maria Elena Martinez-Torres

CIESAS-Sureste, Chiapas

Course description

This course will study the social movements that are transforming the political and social landscape of the Americas. While looking at emergent radical leaders like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia, the focus will be on the new social movements that are sweeping the continent, challenging neo-liberal globalization, the traditional political parties, the formal democratic regimes, and US domination. These movements are offering an alternative to the established power structures while much of the world is engulfed in conflict and war. We'll have guest lecturers for many classes via live video conferences with specialists or activists in the social movements of their countries.

Required Texts

1. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Multitude. War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. Penguin Books, 2005.

2. Diana L. Raby. Democracy and Revolution. Latin America and Socialism Today. Pluto Press, 2006.

3. Roger Burbach and Orlando Nunez, Fire in the Americas, Verso, 1987. All of the required readings from this book are in the Class Reader. If anyone wishes to purchase the book, a limited number of copies are available from Roger at $15.

4. The Class Reader is available at Krishna Copy, 2111 University Ave. at Shattuck, Tel: 540-5959.